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Abstract 
 
 
A fundamental question to both historians and development economists is why countries today 
are able to reach and maintain such starkly different economic outcomes. Popular explanations 
include geographic and climatological features, short-term policy decisions, and economic 
institutions. This paper looks at the importance of violence and social pressure in the 
transformation and conservation of political and economic institutions in Russia. It finds that 
several major historical legacies including serfdom, Mongol dominance, Orthodoxy, and 
authoritarianism significantly influence both the past a present institutional setting. Furthermore, 
such legacies have proven to be major obstructions to the emergence of economic liberalism. 
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“Some of the major turning points in history are characterized by institutional innovations 
that cemented extractive institutions and increased the authority of one group to impose 
law and order and benefit from extraction.” 
 
 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian 
national interest.” 
 
Winston Churchill, BBC Broadcast, October 1, 1939   
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I. Introduction 
For onlookers, much about Russia —its culture, its democracy, its actions— is 
incomprehensible from a Western-centric frame of reference. It is sometimes asserted that strong 
support of the Kremlin’s corrupt political and economic institutions surely must be manipulated, 
but the real facts are much more complex. Research in this field tends to fall into one of two 
broad groups: Russian specialists who start from an internal point and economists who examine 
cross-national data rather than individual countries. This split between two different centers of 
thought leaves gaps in our understanding of how and why economic development takes hold, 
never takes hold, or, as in the Russian instance, loses momentum along the way. In order to come 
to a comprehensive understanding that will not suddenly change with the next election, policy, or 
political contingency, we must understand the origins of development. This thesis identifies a 
mechanism through which social history and violence influence the broader institutional system 
centuries later. A key insight to institutional development is the importance of once-off critical 
events or “shocks,” which are independent of deeper, predictable factors. Economists rarely 
study such events because, by nature, they defy statistical and cross-national analysis. With its 
long history spanning influences from the Mongols to France, Russia is well-suited to such 
analysis. Thus, the overall goal of this project is to build a detailed, country-specific diagnosis of 
economic development using the fascinating trajectory of Russia as a case study.  
There are several interrelated terms that are important to differentiate before proceeding. 
Economic outcome is the material well-being economists seek to maximize. Outcomes for a 
society are most often measured as growth domestic product per capita. They can also be thought 
of more generally as the results of a given social context, which is divided into political and 
economic institutions. While part of the same system, economic institutions are rules and 
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practices most important for economic activity: the tax system, rule of law, and property rights. 
Political institutions deal more with systems of power (e.g. democracy and autocracy): who 
makes the rules, who enforces the rules, and the natural, i.e. agreed upon, succession of power in 
the absence of revolt. Section II discusses and defines institutions in full. Development refers to 
institutional development in the Western model of liberalism that pushes the future boundaries of 
a country’s economic potential. Development is a continuous long-run process, whereas 
technological “borrowing” by backward economies, otherwise known as convergence growth, is 
temporary with ceiling to growth capacity. Researchers have noted that central governments can 
achieve temporary levels of high economic growth in countries that have not industrialized (e.g. 
Soviet “New Economic Policy” in the mid-1920s and later on as well), but there will be no 
innovation as seen in open systems for closed systems once they exhaust convergence growth. 
For example, the industrial revolution, which was driven by communist policies in the Soviet 
Union, temporarily brought rapid growth (at enormous cost to human life it should be noted), but 
stagnated over time. Only liberalization, breaking of the chains of individual enterprise, has led 
to sustained growth (Fish 2005). 
Development also intrinsically connects to real gains in democratic political systems. 
First, it becomes a natural part of market interaction. There is no greater, no more elemental 
political power than millions of individual decisions in a market guiding the direction of society 
day by day. Economic pluralism is democracy at its most fundamental level because it gives 
individuals power in daily interactions. Second, a basis of economic power (de factor power) is 
both an important prerequisite for political contestation and a safeguard for continuing power 
distribution. As French Philosopher Benjamin Constant (1819) wrote, “Commerce inspires in 
men a vivid love of individual independence.” Finally, it incentivizes democracy at the very 
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highest level. For, “The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the 
resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an 
opposition” (Dahl 1971, p. 48). Hoffman (2015) in particular emphasizes this source under his 
argument that competition drove Europe to both development and eventually, democratized 
power. 
This paper has two objectives: First, build a framework that explains general institutional 
transition, stagnation, or decay. Second, test that framework using Russia as a case study. Using 
this approach will not only provide a better understanding of development in Russia, but 
potentially offers lessons applicable to other countries as well. Section II sets the background by 
reviewing the arguments and support of three main camps claiming to explain economic 
outcomes: policy, geography and endowments, and institutions. Explanations based on policy 
and geography each have a major flaw. Thus, the conclusion of this review is that a combination 
of institutions directly and geography indirectly best explain economic outcomes and therefore is 
a fair starting point for analyzing transition. Drawing heavily on several seminal works in 
institutional theory, section III argues that institutional transition requires a conducive 
environment, which is defined as some diversity in economic power, plus a “shock.” Once-off 
critical events, or shocks, occur as violence (e.g. invasion and occupation) or as socially driven 
change (e.g. introduction of a new religion). As indicated above, transition is not always a 
positive development. It can result in decay or conservation of inferior institutions. 
While any framework seeking a general picture of development is necessarily going to be 
complex, the framework created in this paper offers more application than stopping with the 
conclusion that rule of law and property rights are important. Development economists have 
often found that installing rule of law, property rights, and other market characteristics is 
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substantially more difficult in practice than predicted theoretically. Historical legacies unique to 
each country change the rules of the game and broad-stroke research often misses the potential 
effects of these unique legacies. Section IV places Russia’s institutions into our framework. 
While Russia has been and remains a powerful state in a number of measures and its GDP per 
capita is much higher than countries often targeted for development, it has also never fully 
liberalized —never fully transitioned to a modern “open access” society politically. Russia today 
fails basic tests of economic liberalization and democracy, and has for its entire history 
(Rosefielde 2005, p. 4). Rather, it has taken the form of a “sophisticated natural state” where 
elites use a number of levers to maintain their rent extraction. Russia has developed into a 
unique, second-best model that enables it to integrate select parts of capitalism while remaining 
its own animal. This model is built on a remarkable paradox between collectivized power 
distribution and an attachment to “rule by personality.” 
If this is not the most efficient, best outcome in terms of development for Russia, why is 
it the case that it has dominated? Section V looks to the historical record and finds evidence for 
two phases in the story of Russian institutions. In the first phase, geographic circumstance plus 
shocks from Mongols invasion and Byzantine culture determined early institutional form. During 
this time, Russian institutions evolved in near isolation from the West. Once Russia did finally 
come into frequent contact with the West, it was often in a constant state of war with its Western 
neighbors and suffered from a series of major military setbacks from invasion to failed offensive 
campaigns. Even eventual victories often came at significant costs to human life and economic 
productivity. These real threats had tangible impacts for the trajectory of economic institutions, 
reinforcing the first phase system. They formed the basis for “imagined threats” and an anti-
Western narrative. Elites use this as a weapon to maintain their control over institutions by 
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picturing development as a moral threat to Russian greatness and linking liberalization with the 
West. Radical change such as in 1917 and 1991 therefore did not result in transition to a new 
institutional system, but rather a new set of elite in the seat of power controlling extraction. 
Section VI summarizes and concludes with lessons learned on tangible institutional change and 
the factors blocking such change. 
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II. Literature Review 
Many social scientists, and of course historians as well, agree that history matters. 
Divergence in thought is primarily along the exact channels of causality through which history 
affects economic results. Is it natural environment? Religion? Central bank policy? Researchers 
who attempt to identify these channels and answer the fundamental question of “why countries 
have attained substantially different relative economic outcomes,” can be separated into three 
camps: The first argues that a variety of geographical and endowment related factors have direct 
effects on economic outcome. The second camp focuses more on short-term policy decisions. A 
third theory increasing in traction recently is that some formulation of historical institutional 
structure best explains outcomes. Another angle of this theory, which this paper argues can be 
included as a subset, is that physical and human capital accumulation leads to growth. This 
section briefly summarizes prominent works in each, considers cross-country evidence, and 
some application to Russia. Russia’s location in a temperate climate as well as its recent 
experience with policy starting in 1991 suggest that policy and geography are poor explanations 
for economic results relative to other countries.  
Geography and Endowments  
Linking current economic activity to geography and the natural environment of different 
regions traces as far back as Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Law (1748): “Approach the south 
and you will think you are leaving morality itself, the passions become more vivacious and 
multiply crimes.” His diagnosis, while overly condescending, is not far from the conclusions of 
many modern endowments theory proponents. Economist and UN advisor Jeffrey Sachs (2003) 
is a vocal supporter of this camp, arguing that levels of per capita income and other economic 
growth measurements are strongly correlated with ecological or geographical variables such as 
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disease, crops, distance from coast, and —in line with Montesquieu— climate. A specific factor 
he emphasizes is malaria risk. Diamond (1997) in contrast does not focus on the tropics; instead, 
he suggests that germs and crops directly affected development in the long-run. Europeans had 
access to the most favorable distribution of domesticated animals as well as certain grains. 
Additionally, they developed resistance to certain diseases that would decimate other nations 
during Europe’s rise to power.  
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1998) also find effects of location and climate on various 
indicators of economic development through channels of relative transport costs, disease 
burdens, and agricultural productivity. Haber (2012) takes a similar climatological approach to 
Sachs by looking at rainfall and its long-run effects; however, he looks at political institutions 
instead of economic indicators as a sign of development. The channel Haber identifies is that 
storable crops using rain-fed technologies in a decentralized production setting led to social 
settings conducive to growth. Haber’s argument is slightly different from Sachs or Diamond 
because economic outcomes are reliant on the politics of agriculture and rain rather than direct 
effects. He illustrates his point with a comparison of tropical “pineapple kingdoms” to the 
fractionalized nature of agriculture in Europe. In the tropics, many crops like pineapple tended to 
require larger economies of scale relative to crops in temperate regions. This in turn led to high 
incentives for more authoritarian control (Haber 2012, p. 28). A similar process occurred in arid 
climates due to centrally controlled irrigation from large water sources like rivers rather than 
relying on rainfall. Haber’s method is similar to an institutions-based approached because he 
identifies political factors as the direct cause. In other words, rain predicted economic outcomes 
through variance in early societal structures that are correlated with regional rain levels. 
  
13 
 
Hypothetically, if one were to set up those societal structures regardless of rain levels, a Haber-
consistent prediction is that the economic outcome will be the same. 
A troubling fact of the endowment theory is that many of these disadvantaged regions 
have the highest population growth rates. The hypothesis has no clear policy implication, but 
stands as fateful, self-fulling cycle: those countries unfortunate enough to be cursed with said 
factors have poor growth prospects regardless of policy. One of Sach’s actual suggestions is 
mass migration from these inferior locations. The problem is that history is full of exceptions to 
this ecological determinism: Singapore, Hong Kong, Barbados, Costa Rica, and more (Harrison 
2000). Take Australia, which does not have the conducive agricultural climate many proponents 
of this view have in common, Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations Fail give us the 
incredible story of how a country without ideal natural factors was able to go from newly arrived 
convicts and other rejects to high economic development. Why? Institutions allowed human 
ingenuity to work, “convicts were allowed to become entrepreneurs and hire other convicts” 
(2012, p. 278).   Property rights and rule of law predicted growth, not population or geographic 
characteristics. More broadly, Clark (2007) identifies a huge hole in the logic of endowments in 
the modern acceleration of the economic divide because if original geographic disadvantages 
predicted backwardness, as modern industrialization occurred, we would not expect this to 
accentuate geographical differences.  
Perhaps the strongest conceptual argument against endowments theory that has also held 
true in regressions is what social scientists tend to call the “reversal of fortune.” A geographical 
perspective is committed to the fact that income differences are explained by natural factors and 
therefore remain stable over time, which is difficult to reconcile with history. The first example 
is Western Europe’s accession to world dominance. As recently as half a millennium ago, any 
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rational odds maker would not have picked Europe. Living standards, state power, and 
technological advancement were all much higher in China under the Ming Dynasty or the 
growing Ottoman Empire. Slightly earlier, and the Timurid Empire under the last great Eurasian 
conqueror Tamerlane dominated the Silk Road, which had for centuries been the center of 
wealth. European life was backward, underdeveloped, and brutal compared to civilization to the 
East. This changed rapidly starting in the late fifteenth century. By 1914, Europeans had 
conquered 84 percent of the globe and vastly distanced themselves in measures of economic 
development (Hoffman 2017). What happened? Originally wealthy countries adopted inferior 
institutions, which for one reason or another persisted and therefore blocked opportunities to 
industrialize and change. As a result, wealthier areas lost ground as the Western European 
countries exploited new technology and social organization.  
A more controlled instance of reversal economists have modeled is among the countries 
Europe colonized after its own reversal of fortune (Acemoglu et al. 2002). The richest 
civilizations in 1500 at the time of colonization (Mughals, Aztecs, and Incas) effectively 
switched places with previously backward civilizations in North America, New Zealand, and 
Australia. Lastly, divergence regionally such as Northern Italy from Southern Italy or South 
Korea from North Korea is difficult to fit into an endowment theory. If starting factors directly 
and exclusively determine economic outcomes, the relative differences should be durable over 
time (unless of course there are omitted variables). In contrast, outcome reversal does align with 
an “institutional reversal.” At the very least, geographical advantages change based on factors 
like technology, which is what some theorist use as a revised version of endowment theory to 
explain the pivot from land-based advantages of the Silk Road to oceanic trade giving Europeans 
the upper hand (Gallup et al. 1998). While geography clearly is relevant somewhere in the story, 
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a now-weakened endowment theory approach that allows for changing effects over time also 
opens the door to arguments that endowments are not deterministic. 
Russia in particular is a tough case for endowment theory proponents. The European 
areas of Russia occupy the same latitudes as highly prosperous and democratic northern Europe 
and Canada. It checks the most common boxes for development: disease environment, crop and 
livestock variability, and rainfall. Haber points to the divergence in economic outcomes of 
Central Asia from European parts of the Soviet Union following its collapse as support for his 
narrative based on rainfall, but he fails to address differences in outcome of Russia from the 
Baltic States or Russia from Western European states. Perhaps more plausible geographic 
variables to point to would be geopolitical vulnerability and the gigantic size of Russia. The 
difference in size between Russia and England could not be more noticeable, they are on two 
extremes as it were. Most likely due to the specificity and lack of comparable data on such 
factors, there has been little economic work on this explanation. Conceptually, however, some 
historians point to Russia’s geographical setting as an explanation of outcomes at least in part. 
Close to the steppe, the Ural and Caucasus Mountains both fail to provide a serious barrier to 
Eastern threats. Russia acts as a buffer between East and West. In such a harsh climatic and 
geographic milieu, novelty and experimentation could genuinely be hazardous, even disastrous 
(Hosking 2001). Russia also had to deal with much longer and particularly severe natural 
calamities, which led to an output-seed ration that did remain among the lowest in Europe for 
centuries (Kahan 1989).  
An interesting subset of the endowments theory is the “resource curse” literature, which 
is especially relevant to Russia considering its huge share of the world’s oil, gas, and other 
mineral resources. Sachs and many others have argued in support of a negative relationship 
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between natural resource endowment and economic growth. Thus, the idea is also known as the 
“paradox of plenty” because an abundance of natural resource wealth, typically thought to be a 
major bounty, is actually said to have negative impacts on economic growth and democracy. Fish 
(2005) finds significant negative correlation between openness and raw material abundance, 
which he links to Russia’s endemic corruption. Compared to advanced technological production, 
services, or agriculture, natural resources are an easily controlled source power. More people can 
be excluded from economic institutions reliant on natural resources. There are also huge payoffs 
from this identifiable and easily controlled source of rent, which leads to increased likelihood of 
revolution. Yet, revolution in this instance has a different de facto power makeup than revolution 
wherein a more diverse set of actors (e.g. landed nonelite) are the source of discontent. 
Recent empirical literature, however, points consistently to a “conditional resource curse” 
dependent on existing political structures. In other words, endowments act as a catalyst of 
increased momentum in whichever way the country was already in —be it good economic 
institutions or bad (van der Ploeg 2011; Wright and Czelusta 2004). For example, the U.S. used 
investments in specific knowledge of mineral, oil, and gas production in the early 1900s to help 
propel it to world leadership in productivity and manufacturing. In a country where strong 
institutions and diversified power are already present, interested parties will never allow rent-
seeking elites to monopolize natural resources (i.e. Standard Oil breakup in the U.S.). Instead, 
the political institutions will ensure wide distribution of gains. Haber has an interesting take that 
confirms this conditionality, arguing that literature identifying a resource-curse has miss-
specified the causal chain between authoritarianism and natural resource exports: unconstrained 
power leads to higher investment in natural resource production because it allows for more 
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control over economic power (Haber 2012). As we will see in the following section, this fits 
perfectly in a framework of economic institutional change that is driven by power relationships.  
There is little doubt that geography and the natural environment play a role on economic 
history, and the responses laid out above do not reject its influence (Nunn 2009). Institutionalists 
just think there is more to the story, and that it is more helpful to understand that part of the 
story. “Clearly, democracy does not fall directly from the sky with a continual light drizzle. 
Something stands between the level of precipitation and the level of democracy” (Haber 2012, p. 
14). 
Policy 
The second camp does not boast much generalist support and arguments are often for 
specific countries and written by specialists of those countries. This approach, as it sounds, 
focuses on the very short term horizon. For the most part, the policy approach overlooks history 
and argues that countries are not path dependent. In practice, it is a collection of many different 
approaches based on what side of the political spectrum the advocate falls into. The major 
argument it offers to the other two camps is that history does not play a large role and any 
weaknesses in economic development can be quickly reversed. Glaeser, La Porta, Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004) argue that poor countries get out of poverty through good policies often under 
dictators, and subsequently improve their political institutions. An important component 
according to Glaeser et al. is that countries that emerge from poverty accumulate human and 
physical capital under dictatorships first. This can be true and at the same time not in conflict 
with an institutionalist perspective. In fact, such accumulation is key for de facto power 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Nonelites with more physical capital (land or resources) and 
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human capital (innovation or new organization strategies) will be in a better position to not only 
revolt, but also lock in their gains with political reform. 
Case studies are especially popular for those in the policy camp. One such study 
contrasted Barbados and Jamaica, arguing that they shared similar institutions to start, yet 
income diverged over a period of several decades due to divergence in macroeconomic policy 
(Henry and Miller 2009). Another case compared Estonia to other, less successful former Soviet 
countries, pointing out that it used hardline policy to establish good economic outcomes (Abrams 
and Fish 2015). Their conclusion is that “Institutions are more likely to be the effects of good 
policies than the cause of them” (p. 508). Even when the reverse is true (policies fail to spur 
development), adherents to this camp simply shift ground by arguing that a different set of 
policies would have done the trick. Take Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 as an example. It is now popular to criticize “shock therapy” and the “Washington 
Consensus” as doomed to failure. Some say that reform did not happen fast enough and that 
more was needed (Fish and Choudhry 2007, p. 277), while others take the complete opposite 
position that a more gradual approach was needed (Goldman 1994). In practice therefore, the 
policy approach is actually more fluid and ill-defined than the institutional approach it critiques 
on the same basis. 
In effect, policy advocates are attempting to create institutional change without 
understanding history. Policymakers and international organization hope for a one size fits all 
policy to diagnose economic underdevelopment around the world. Unfortunately, it is not that 
easy. What might be working for development in Estonia and Barbados may not be the same 
thing that works in Sierra Leo. After the collapse of communism, Alan Greenspan was confident 
that establishing a prosperous free-market system in Russia would happen almost automatically 
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as they were incorporated into the international system. Years later after failure to fully 
transition, he concluded somberly that he had missed the question of culture (Harrison 2000). 
Growth is also not only a national question. Anzoategui, Easterly, and Pennings (2016) find that 
as little as one-half of growth is determined at the national level with the rest split both supra-
nationally and regionally: “Consistent with a growing literature, our results suggest that many of 
the deep determinants of growth (for example institutions, geography or culture) may vary at 
sub-national or supra-national levels.” Supra-nationally, policies can vary widely with some 
similar results because neighboring countries share deeper institutions while sub-nationally the 
same is true when regions develop differently despite the same policy atmosphere. The former 
Soviet Union is a fascinating example of these dual effects. From 1917-1991, different regions 
developed with varying results under similar policies because of cultural difference. Post-
collapse, despite different policies, every republic faces some of the same institutional legacies. 
Researchers for the most part point to a clear set of reliably important institutions for 
development (rule of law, property rights, trust, etc.), but setup and enforcement of such 
institutions is heavily context dependent. What proponents really seek is a way to transform 
institutions. Rather than pretending they do not matter or are not enduring, perhaps it would be 
helpful to seek understanding of their historical role before attempting any influential policy. 
This point is what drove the establishment of the “new institutionalist school.” Acemoglu and 
Robinson came up with the idea for their now famous book Why Nations Fail in 1997 while at an 
economic conference. One presenter apparently used historical data from the previous two 
decades to explain underdevelopment in Haiti, which prompted incredulity on their part because 
it ignored any deep-seated process related to development. “You need to go back two hundred 
years, not twenty” (Morrell 2012). Solution lies in fundamental changes: integration into the 
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West, fostering economic competition, spreading political power. Such change usually does not 
happen quickly, and when it does, it tends to under radical reform rather than “the right policy.” 
Returning to Estonia, in the first place the country did have a more liberal set of institutions prior 
to communism and even during communism compared to other republics. Second, perhaps there 
was institutional reform political actors quickly created new rules and norms, judges and civil 
servants took pride in their incorruptibility, and a new set of capitalist, non-rent-seeking 
entrepreneurs were established. This political reform helped establish new institutions in the long 
term such that if the elites temporarily gained back power, they would not be able to merely roll 
back policy.  
Institutions Matter 
The final camp sometimes referred to as “new institutionalism,” rests its case on the 
economic institutions that shape incentives economic actors face. While individual studies often 
identify certain time-periods or constraints to guide measurement of causal impacts, the overall 
conceptual framework of institutionalists spans across politics, culture, and organizations. It is 
therefore critical to comprehensively outline what we mean by institutions before examining the 
evidence.  
What are institutions? Many new institutionalists begin with Douglass North’s definition: 
"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, p. 3). They have a quality of durability while at 
the same time occur at an interaction level more complex than that of our most fundamental 
social interactions, which are personal and often based on kinship. Durability distinguishes 
institutions from policy, which is action or inaction by the state with a specific objective in mind. 
Policies are much easier to pass, reverse, or even simply ignore whereas institutions have a 
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longer impact on the future by changing the power structure. The Magna Charta or the Glorious 
Revolution were both institutional changes because they substantively changed political power 
and could not be simply reversed the next day, thereby setting the stage for substantial economic 
change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Not only are institutions durable, but there tends to be 
an effort to conserve them. Thus, even when the original context in which they arose fades, 
institutions will continue to have a lasting impact —often in efforts to thwart new interests and 
competition. This mirrors exactly the aforementioned great reversal when Europe overtook 
China and the Middle East.  
While we tend to think of institutions as something formal like a constitution or 
presidential structure, institutions can span a wide set of formal rules, written laws, formal social 
conventions, informal norms of behavior, shared beliefs about the world, and acceptable means 
of enforcement. Institutions say something about how the world operates in practice, not just in 
theory. North, Wallis, and Weingast explain,  
The most common way of thinking about institutions is that they are constraints on the 
behavior of individuals as individuals; for example, if the speed limit is sixty miles per 
hour, how fast should I drive? However, institutions also structure the way individuals 
form beliefs and opinions about how other people will behave: for example, if the speed 
limit is sixty miles per hour, how fast will other drivers drive? Framed in this way, we 
ask what types of institutions can survive given the interaction of the institutional 
constraints, people’s beliefs, and their behavior (2009, p. 15).  
 
In a given society, different components adapt to each other forming an overall institutional 
system. This is why a country like our case study might have a constitution that looks very 
similar, even stronger to that of the U.S.’s, yet have a radically different overall institutional 
system. While a necessary and prominent component of institutions is formal, the mechanisms of 
checks and balances created in developed democracies, no set of formal rules can ensure full 
compliance. Reliance has to be placed on placed upon habitual compliance with the law, 
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honesty, and trust. Economists sometimes think of these informal institutional factors as non-
exhaustible inputs into economic transactions (Granville and Oppenheimer 2001). 
This buy in by social actors is essential in forming the consensus that dictates how 
institutions actually work. Ideally, buy in is supportive of good formal institutions and helps 
police the rules informally by withdrawing support from violators (North et al. 2009). In a 
counterintuitive way, modern liberal capitalism is not just about the written rules. Take Warren 
Buffet, perhaps the most eminent and successful capitalist in history. When asked what he looks 
for in companies and leadership one of the first answers he gives is integrity. Why does that 
matter? Because informal norms and beliefs are an important part of the overall institutional 
system. Buffet understands that he cannot rely on coercive enforcement at every turn, so he only 
will deal with businesses that follow the institutions even when deviation could offer short-term 
gain with little risk for punishment. At the fundamental level, what we are identifying is trust, 
which has been related to a number of societal phenomena such as democracy, civil society, and 
economic performance (Stickley et al. 2009). Institutions both structure trust in a productive 
manner and allow it to grow. Compare an impersonal, market interaction to a similar personal or 
kinship interaction. In the former, the idea is not that you can trust the other person to have an 
interest in you; rather, you both place trust in the institution thereby conferring benefit 
horizontally if the trust is mutual. A kinship based interaction in contrast is based on a direct 
relationship of trust —perhaps sometimes more assured, but also extremely limiting in scale of 
potential actors.  
Institutions are how we escape a brutal, Hobbesian "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short" state of nature. What we have begun to describe is the more exhaustive game theoretic 
explanation for the existence of institutions. Institutions are an extension of humanity’s social 
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nature: the need for collective action and our ability to act in organization. They are how human 
behavior evolves alongside and in connection with our nature. According to Fukuyama (2011), a 
set of biological preconditions form “an innate propensity for creating and following” norms or 
rules over a long-run game, these include: an innate sociability originally built around kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism, a propensity for violence, and a desire for material gains as 
well as social recognition (p. 439). While these biological characteristics ensure that societies 
will have some level of institutionalization even if it is driven by the most baseline familial 
relationships, there is no determined state of such political order. The above tendencies 
accumulate over time to form into unique, durable manifestations: 
An institution is composed of common knowledge regarding salient features of 
equilibrium plays of the game out of the many possible . . . In everyday language, an 
institution is salient, self-sustaining features of social interactions, held as the common 
knowledge of all the agents about ways in which they are to act/not act (contingent on the 
evolving state). It can be regarded as rules of the game endogenously constructed and 
self-sustaining (Aoki 2006, p. 7). 
 
In essence, institutions are ways we have codified solutions to the collective action problem so as 
not to reinvent the wheel with each generation, they are not set in stone, but are generally 
endogenously determined without intervention upsetting the cycle. Societies create “mental 
models” of reality critical for facilitating large scale collective action (Fukuyama 2011, p. 442).  
Figure 1 illustrates Aoki’s explanation of institutions in the described endogenous form. 
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Accumulation of such knowledge over time into shared institutions frees actors from 
relying on personal relationships or equivalent basic social norms. Instead, actors rely on a type 
of idiosyncratic “knowledge of particular time and space” created by the institutions themselves 
as Hayek (1945) identifies in the example of capitalist institutions. The equilibrium also consists 
of general shared knowledge and behavioral belief discussed earlier under trust (two actors in an 
impersonalized interaction may not trust their best interest to each other, but they both place trust 
in the system). Institutionalizing is an endogenously reinforcing, dynamic process. One of the 
most powerful forces it unleashes is collective action in the form of organizations at a scale that 
was previously impossible. Organizations are defined as “specific groups of individuals pursuing 
a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior” (North et al. 
2009). This common action can be either self-enforced based on incentive-compatible goals, or it 
can also take the form of a contract with third-party enforcement. Organizations played critical 
roles in private or quasi-private commerce through corporations and early trade contracts as 
European mercantilism grew. Kuran (2008) traces how historical Islamic law discouraged large-
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Figure 1: “Institutions as rules created by shared beliefs” (Aoki 2006) 
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scaled contracts (and by extension scaled organization) in the Middle East, which turned out to 
be a key factor in the great reversal. Organizations are important in the public and political 
sphere, making up what is often termed civil society: political parties, interest associations, labor 
unions, and social movements.  
Figure 2 illustrates our understanding of the institutional cycle up to this point:  
 
 
 
Geography does not affect economic outcomes directly (1), but does influence the early forms of 
agriculture and social beliefs (2). Very early forms of a political institutions share a starting point 
based on human nature (personal and kinship based), but the early results of (2) will affect the 
power dynamic in (3) and resulting political system that emerges in (4). Depending on their level 
of control, elites in the political system will fashion economic institutions to their advantage in 
(5), which in turn determines economic outcomes (6). Finally, economic development is self-
enforcing (7), which means that once a given system achieves equilibrium, there is no expected 
change in the absence of exogenous change.    
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One may have noticed that the term “culture” is largely absent or used as a substitute for 
institution, but this is not completely accurate. The question of culture is a difficult one. “In any 
given society, all the institutions present in that society are adapted to each other; they all 
function together as components of an overall institutional system, and it is only by a kind of 
provisional abstraction that we can talk about any one of them in isolation from the whole system 
of which it is a part” (Dennison 2014, p. 251). Culture is contained in informal institutions 
(returning to the discussion of Buffet, company culture is now frequently the focus of 
productivity research), but also can be thought of independently.  
It is not without use, however, to build some degree of separation between culture and 
institutions prior to incorporating them into the broad institutional system. Culture is one of the 
few channels through which potential change to a set of institutions can take hold. It is more 
difficult to monitor and control from the center and thus sometimes confounds feedback of 
political and economic institutions (refer to arrow 7 in Figure 2). Whereas endowment theorist 
have a persuasive case that initial environmental aspects dictate what the first power distribution 
and therefore political system will look like, they have a harder time explaining pivots a country 
makes after adopting a new religion or set of values. Therefore, I define culture as the set of 
values people (usually a distinct group such as religion or nationality) have of how the world 
ought to work, as well as how the world in reality works. Culture in turn dictates norms of 
behavior that go into institutions as illustrated in the earlier smuggling example. Russian 
sociologists Lotman and Andrevitch offer a more exhaustive definition: 
Culture can be understood as non-hereditary memory of a group, expressed in a certain 
system of prohibitions and commandments. Does not preclude an axiological approach 
and it is true for the group itself, culture always appears as a set system of values. The 
outside observer from an external perspective can understand both the value system itself 
and the internal point of view process for that group.  In other words, it is “the dynamics 
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of a culture’s self-consciousness” which can help explain changes in normative positions 
(Lotman and Andrevitch 1985, p. 30).  
 
What Lotman and Andrevitch are saying here in terms of adopting an external perspective is 
extremely useful for the objective of this paper. Usually, observers stop at explaining actions by 
a value system (i.e. religious extremism and terrorism). The next step of analysis, however, 
involves understanding the process that developed that time-specific outcome. Sections IV and V 
focus on this step by analyzing the historical record of Russia and the Russian people.  
Culture itself as a theory for development has a rich history first popularized by Max 
Weber (1930) in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber argued that specifically 
Calvinist Protestantism ignited the rise of modern capitalism by rejecting parts of Roman faith 
that had spurned material gain and sanctioning an ethic of everyday thrift to replace it. Current 
research also finds substantial differences in savings rates by religion as well as higher 
innovation and economic growth in cultures that score strong on individualism (Guiso et al. 
2006; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2016). So why include culture under institutions instead of 
separately? Because turning to culture alone is circular. It may be helpful for comparisons of 
current position, but culture alone fails to explain transition. As Barrington Moore (1996) wrote, 
“to explain behavior in terms of cultural values is to engage in circular reasoning.” Culture feeds 
into institutions and therefore economic outcomes and behavior, but it does not fully explain it. 
Explaining current Russian development as a result of behavior and behavior as a result of 
cultural values does not get us anywhere useful. Additionally, formal institutions, informal 
institutions, and culture all are similar in our game theoretic formation of institutions (Figure 1).  
Weber is also somewhat misinterpreted. Lost is the fact that Weber also points to rational 
bookkeeping and capitalistic organization of labor —entities that look suspiciously like new 
formal institutions. Similar to endowments, culture influences economic outcomes through the 
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types of institutions it sets up. It is not necessarily rainfall or Protestantism per-say that resulted 
in economic growth; rather, it is the institutions these factors happened to result in. Protestantism 
does not have a monopoly over a certain work ethic just as agriculture is no longer the defining 
factor of economic might. For example, under the Meji Restoration Japan adopted Western 
institutions resulting in stable and long term economic growth without adopting the same 
Protestant ethic. Similarly, that same thrift study also identified Buddhists as currently having 
higher thrift rates than Christians (Guiso et al. 2006). The relationship between individualism 
and innovation or economic growth remains strong even after controlling for institutions and 
other potentially confounding factors (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2016). In other words, a 
Japanese Weber could have made the same argument following the Meji Restoration. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006), although they do not consider culture in-depth, argue that “as long as one 
accepts the premise that the interests of individuals are partly about economic outcomes, our 
basic analysis remains unaltered” even if ideas about politics matter (p. 42).  
Empirical evidence for the importance of institutions in economic development is both 
strong and abundant. Easterly and Levine (2003) test the endowment, institution, and policy 
theories against each other and find evidence that endowments affect development through 
institutions as this paper has argued conceptually. “In sum, the results . . .  provide strong support 
for the institutions hypothesis but no evidence for the geography hypothesis. Endowments 
explain institutions, which in turn explain economic development.” A result confirmed in tests 
by additional researchers (Rodrik et al. 2004). Other studies have also found a strong relationship 
between more democratic distributions of power and rule of law, control of corruption, and 
income (Giuliano and Nunn 2013).  
  
29 
 
Well-published members of the institutionalist camp Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, 
and James Robinson (2001) gained notoriety for their innovative article "The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation" in which they used settler mortality 
rates in the New World as an instrumental variable to examine whether or not extractive 
institutions were established and what the effects of established institutions. In a wide range of 
tests controlling for geographical and endowment related factors, they found persistent and 
significant effects explained by institutions. Differences in common formal and informal 
commercial practices determined the reversal of fortune in colonized areas. Similarly, Acemoglu 
and Robinson make the case for inclusive institutions and pluralism in their book Why Nations 
Fail. They use examples ranging from the macro level over long periods of time like Great 
Britain and China, to a more regional level such as North and South Korea or even the split in 
development from North to South in the U.S. leading up to the Civil War. Their conclusion is 
that all countries who have succeed share several commonalities: elite lost control over the state, 
government became accountable and responsive, and incentives allowed people to maximize 
economic opportunity.  
The institutionalist camp fits well with the current picture of politics, development, and 
culture in Russia. In terms of formal institutions, Russia suffers from an overpowered presidency 
that is currently working to undermine democracy. Some have warned of the dangers of a 
presidential system directly (Linz 1990; Mainwaring 1993). Another take is that what matters for 
democracy is not whether the constitutional system is formally presidential, semi-presidential, or 
parliamentary, but rather how strong the legislature truly is (Fish 2005). Either way, Putin has 
clearly been able to reconsolidate rent-seeking power in his office (e.g. effectively 
renationalizing large energy companies). One of the most important institutional components 
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where Russia struggles is in rule of law. La Porta et al. (1999) find a link between per capita 
incomes and “government performance” in what is good for economic performance, in which 
they list security of property rights, lack of intervention, benign regulation, and low taxation. 
Their research also identifies political history as determining most clearly which governments 
perform better (p. 266).  
Although Russia formally adopted many institutions and policies similar to the West, it 
never developed the full extent of check and balances or a culture of horizontal relations 
important to the success of such policies. Especially on the informal side, the prevailing culture 
for centuries has been of hierarchy and consolidated power, which predicts the Kremlin’s rise 
(Migranyan 2015). One account cites a businessman who lamented, "Above all, it is the lack of 
common honesty in Russia, in its narrowest and most ordinary fatal flaw in character deprives 
the government of the able executive power, by robbing it of a necessary number of honest, 
faithful lower-ranking officials” (Rosefielde spring 2005). Surveys in Russia find low levels of 
institutional trust with “deep historical roots” (Stickley et al. 2009). The culture does matter 
because, just as people are likely to obey the rules if they believe that other people will also obey 
the rules, they are also likely to ignore the rules if they believe others do ignore them as well. For 
example, I once spent a period living in a former Soviet Republic. What struck me most in a 
conversation with one native Russian while there was not the levels of corruption she faced, but 
her acceptance that “this was the way things worked,” the way society operated. Soviet “blat,” 
which roughly translates to a culture of favors, is endemic to the overall Russian institutional 
system (see Ledeneva 1998).  
This section has sought to outline the basic frameworks of common explanations to the 
divergence question along with some support for institutionalism as the best explanation. Unlike 
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other topics, understanding economic development is more about ordering and conceptualizing 
various factors than identifying one exclusive causal explanation. Sachs, who ironically is one of 
the more blunt critics of camps he disagrees with, concluded that: “There is good theoretical and 
empirical reason to believe that the development process reflects a complex interaction of 
institutions, policies, and geography” (2003, p. 9). 
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III. A Framework of Institutional Transition 
“If you’re going to set up a society on a new planet, you don’t want to have the 
government running itself off the labor of robots or mining rents. You have to set up an 
economy where everybody is needed, everybody is valued. That is a big lesson from 
these successful experiences.”  
 
Robinson, in an interview on Freakonomics Radio, 2017 
 
The field of comparative and historical economic development is typically descriptive 
because empirical work focuses on what matters and why, while placing less emphasis on how 
development forms over time.  For pure endowment theory proponents, the answer is 
straightforward: history begins and ends with location. For institutionalists, transitions are 
complicated. It is much easier to analyze the effects of particular aspects (individualism, property 
rights, extractive institutions, etc.) on income than to explain why some countries embraced 
those aspects in the first place or insist on rejecting them now despite the overwhelming 
evidence that markets and capitalism provide better outcomes. And while certain institutions will 
have nearly identical economic consequences if they are indeed the same, rarely do two countries 
take the same path to those institutions. This section builds a concept of transition based on 
synthesis of three primary texts: North, Wallis, and Weingast’s Violence and Social Order 
(2009), Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order (2011), and Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006).  
Fukuyama focuses on political evolution, comparing it to biological evolution (see 
section II) with two key differences: rules take the place of genes and their evolution can occur 
deliberately instead of in an unplanned manner (p. 446). He postulates that political systems vary 
widely with the stronger tending to supplant the weaker through either conversation or conquest. 
Since culture transmits formal political institutions, so change can occur both faster and slower 
than biological evolution. Acemoglu and Robinson believe that time and power distributions are 
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key in understanding transition. They split power into de jure and de facto power; where a 
system allocates de jure power and de facto is Hobbesian brute force. In all early political orders, 
elites monopolize de jure power, but have varying levels of control over de facto power. 
Transition happens when non-elites have a sufficient stock of de facto power to challenge elites 
and solve their collective action problem. These historical instances are temporary, “Collective 
action is intrinsically transitory” so non-elites institutionalize their temporary advantage in 
relative power by changing political institutions as in the Magna Carta (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006, p. 128). In other words, during successful transition reformers subconsciously grasp that 
their current political power to affect change is fleeting and therefore seek to entrench that power 
over the long-term in institutions. If they are unable to do so, elites will inevitably regain power 
and the cycle will revert to its previous equilibrium rather than achieving a new equilibrium.   
Powerful English Barons are probably not who initially come to mind as an example of 
“non-elites,” but the relevant point is that there is a durable shift in the political order even if it 
only goes to a select few. England did not liberalize in one fell swoop. North, Wallis, and 
Weingast (2009) also consider there to be two different types of shifts. The first type takes place 
within the natural state of society and serves to expand the elite (e.g. Magna Carta). The natural 
state is based on the basic conditions of human nature that Fukuyama identified. In other words, 
it is a state dominated by personal power hierarchies driven by kinship and friendship. Within a 
natural state, society can move from a “fragile state” with a small circle of ruling elite always 
seemingly on the edge of conflict to a “mature state.” A mature state has begun to develop initial 
civic and commercial organizations and an increasingly complex power balance undergirds elite 
consensus. The second shift is to an open-access system, where control is in the hands of citizens 
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and has become mostly impersonalized. In this system, impersonal rule of law and organizations 
balance power rather than personal ruling elite or elite coalitions.  
Violence and Social Turnover  
Transition has two components (see Figure 3) that will together determine the outcome 
of transitionary period. The first, which NWW place more emphasis on, is the environment. The 
environment is the characteristics of actors involved in the transition. In transitions, what the 
previous economic institutions and cultural norms support will affect the effectiveness of change. 
The second component is a shock —some spark that upsets equilibrium. A one-off event of this 
nature can be either endogenous or exogenous. Internally, 
a previously unorganized or out of power group to solve 
the collective action problem in reaction to perceived 
injustice while externally, a new group appearing on the 
international stage could upset stability.  
Different combinations and strengths of shocks and 
environment, whether they work in harmony or opposition, 
will determine the outcome. For example, a Mongol horde crushing and occupying a state is 
likely to result in transition whether or not the environment is fully conducive to that specific 
change. In contrast, a fleeting peasant-driven revolution is only likely to result in long-term 
change if the environment is also conducive to new institutions. Some literature has noted how 
different subcomponents of institutions (formal, informal, cultural) tend to occur or change at 
different rates. Cultures usually change slowly and continually, or rapidly and irregularly while 
political institutions tend to change rapidly and temporarily (Roland 2008). Because of 
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differences in the manner in which power is deployed some societies collapse in response to 
shocks whereas others prove adaptive (North et al. 2009).   
Figure 4 highlights how these two shocks usually fit into our earlier model. Social 
change, such as widespread conversion to Islam in the Middle East and parts of Asia, changes 
the overall institutional system at the first level, similar to what analysis of geography. 
Significant changes in beliefs and social norms then will ripple through the system. Violence, 
whether it originates internally or externally, initially bypasses social order and changes the 
power dynamic directly.  
 
 
 
 
What about policy impacts? Aoki (2006) has a very insightful discussion surrounding 
policy:  
Certainly, there are many instances in which policy and legislative actions (as 
consequences) in the political exchange domain appear to trigger institutional changes in 
other domains. But even in this case, the process can be characterized as an instance of 
dynamic institutional complementarities in which policy change (a consequence of the 
play of the game in the polity domain) is initiated in response to the emergence of 
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concomitant endogenous changes in other domains, while policies reinforce 
complementary interactions across those domains. As a consequence, it is not rare for 
policies to ultimately yield unintended institutional outcomes in the end (p. 32). 
[Emphasis added] 
 
Economic institutions are determined often through policy of the political institutions, but it is 
hard to point to the political institutions as originating in policy. The point Aoki is makes is that 
policy can be explained endogenously as different parts of the cycle balance and respond to each 
other at equilibrium.  
One of the important questions Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) address is why elites in 
some countries would give concessions and start down the path to democracy while others 
refuse. One reason is that repression is costly, especially in more urbanized locations (a big 
difference for Russia). Elites generally do not want to kill or throw in prison peasants they could 
otherwise tax or use in wars against other countries. Second, the top elite (e.g. king or tsar) needs 
an organized circle of support in order to take power, run the country, and fight wars. While 
terror strategies and repression is one way to maintain support, co-optation can often be better or 
easier. Thus, small concessions that can have lasting institutional impact are made in return for 
support. Third, to resort to repression without losing support, the target group must be 
sufficiently demonized such that the rest of the support base is willing to go along (e.g. historical 
demonization of Jews). Whether the maneuvering is between the top power and elite circle (e.g. 
Tsar and boyars) or the broader elites with the nonelites (e.g. American revolution), a similar 
game takes place. In other words, repression requires gaming that fits under the old adage 
“divide and conquer.” One holdup for elites, however, is that division is not always 
straightforward. Existence of a middle class makes repression more costly by virtue of its 
education, economic and social status (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Section V expands 
further on this holdup by comparing serfdom practices in Russia to those in England to find that 
  
37 
 
because there was weaker customary law, repression was much easier and longer lasting in 
Russia. 
Social shocks to the system are much more challenging to encapsulate than violence. Part 
of this is because change often occurs at a slower pace than violence and because a distinction 
between internal and external social shocks is not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, social 
upheaval is an important component for predicting institutional formation. Different widespread 
social beliefs naturally affect how political institutions will react along that specific issue. “What 
people believe about what it takes to be prosperous has much to do with how they behave” 
(Porter 2000, p. 23). This is especially true for economic institutions. For example, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2006) find evidence that Americans are more likely to attribute success to hard 
work than are Europeans and that “these differences in background beliefs imply different public 
reactions to economic circumstances.” Conceptually, if something were to shift these 
background beliefs, our argument is that institutions would likely adjust to reflect this change. 
What are some ways that social change can spark institutional transition? One of the 
more common is through religion as Fukuyama argues. A second and more complex channel is 
related to leaders. The Great Man Theory explains history through highly influential leaders and 
there is reason to believe that such leaders could be a result of their institutional system, the 
cause of it, or a combination of the two depending on the circumstance. Russia, from its early 
Tsarist years up through today, has been connected with hugely powerful and personal leaders 
(Ivan IV, Peter I, Catherine II, Stalin, Putin, etc.), yet none have fundamentally broken with the 
underlying extractive institutional system. Thus, this fits into the first category, leaders as a result 
of the institutional context. A working paper by Lowes et al. (2017) that finds evidence of formal 
institutions under the former Kuba Kingdom influencing culture to this day, but there is a notable 
  
38 
 
secondary implication the authors do not focus on. The kingdom arose due to an institutional 
innovator named Shyaam who did not fit the mold of leaders at the time. Likewise, Genghis 
Khan was an institutionally innovative leader who had a significant effect on Mongol 
institutions. He adjusted and combined previous institutions with lasting impact on the system 
equilibrium. Lastly, Napoleon combines the two. While some of his nationalist tendencies and 
popularity cannot be separated from the institutions that preceded him, the Napoleonic Code had 
lasting institutional effects.  
Capital Accumulation and Competition 
Turning to the context of institutional change, many researchers have emphasized the 
importance of human and physical capital accumulation. In our framework, these factors are the 
soil or fuel for institutional transition. A few modern proponents treat it as a critique of 
institutions. They argue that accumulation is directly linked to growth. For example, Clark 
(2007) argues that important economic institutions like those in England prior to the industrial 
revolution existed elsewhere without the same results. He focuses on an interpretation of human 
capital accumulation, “downward mobility,” that occurred in England over a long period time. 
The rich and successful had more children than poorer classes, thereby passing down attributes 
that would later ensure economic dynamism (work ethic, innovativeness, education, etc.). Clark 
then argues that this process happened faster than in China, Japan, or other European countries. 
Undoubtedly, the process Clark and others identified is important for transition, but as an 
explanation in itself, it is problematic. First, variance in birthrates and the structure of inheritance 
is lacking as a starting point. What determines birthrates and inheritance rules other than the 
overall institutional system? Second, transition required multiple instances of political uprising 
and reform. Economic growth and the emergence of a middle class, regardless if it was due to 
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downward or upward mobility happened because new middle class occupations existed —take 
away the political framework and the outcome could look very different.  
That is not to claim that accumulation is not critical process. It is essential, fully 
unleashing the power of open access. However, alone it does not instigate open access. In other 
words, accumulation theories are a catalyst that ignited the kind of exponential growth seen 
during the industrial revolution. Nevertheless they are not a good explanation as to why some 
countries were already on that path while others to this day struggle to reached advanced growth 
(e.g. Russia) or even the most basic level of modernization (countries still hovering near 
subsistence levels). Put into NWW terms, accumulation exhibits the full power of political 
pluralism, efficient institutions, and impersonal organizations. “Organizations are the lifeblood 
of both political and economic competition. They are the vehicles through which economic and 
political entrepreneurs implement their ideas and affect the dynamics of the economy and the 
polity” (NWW 2009). 
This distinction noted, ground must now be given back to accumulation theorists because 
it is important to note here that it is not a one-step process. Reaching the benefits of open-access 
institutions is akin to a set of stairs leading to the party of one’s dreams. Each step involves 
building momentum by moving horizontally closer to the next jump (some accumulation of 
capital) as well as a sudden vertical break to reach a new level of institutionalization. At the very 
early stages, “vertical jumps” occur when the ruler slightly expands the circle of supporting elite 
as well as their rights while the final stage will involve society as a whole demanding continuing 
political power through representative government. Many writers have argued that the formation 
of a large class of small property holders — that is, a middle class— facilitates democratization 
and further economic development (Moore 1966; Fish and Choudhry 2007). This is by no means 
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an inevitable process, elite intervention can happen along the way. Just as human nature allows 
for progressive evolution to more advanced institutions, stagnation can occur as a natural result 
of our desire to conserve institutions. The relationship of accumulation to the type of shock is 
relevant for understanding transition. Cultural factors are often the counterproductive force 
behind conservation or current, inefficient institutions because, at least in the long run, violence 
tends to run out of power or run into greater de facto power. So while violence undoubtedly 
plays a role in continued backwardness of underdeveloped countries today, a period of cultural 
change is also needed for the introduction of Western institutions to be successful.  
Perhaps the most powerful catalyst, competition, is present both domestically and 
internationally. Similar to accumulation, it cannot by itself explain transition, but it is a powerful 
force. We already examined how domestic competition in an open-access society between 
impersonal organizations rapidly drives up economic outcomes. Another fascinating role of 
competition is through external violence. Hoffman’s thesis in Why Did Europe Conquered the 
World? (2015) is that Europe did so through a tournament of war with outsize expenditures on 
military technology eventually transforming into major development advantages. He points out 
that geographic factors alone cannot explain history nor industrialization because Europe had 
already conquered 35% of the globe before it began to industrialize. The argument he makes is 
for fragmentation, but he does not explain why this occurred. Therefore, his ultimate cause of 
political history is consistent with our framework. As Hoffman notes, “Britain’s economic 
victory was similar to its military victory, produced by political history” (p. 213).  
The centuries-long tournament European powers engaged forced rulers to dedicate 
enormous resources towards winning some prize (whether it be for financial gain, territorial 
expansion, faith, or glory). For example, well over 80% of the annual budgets of England and 
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Prussia between 1688 and 1790 were spent on waging war. What is especially fascinating about 
this fact is that exerting tremendous military effort led to Europe’s development rather than 
exhaustion and damaging conflict. Why did Europe suddenly explode in development rather than 
falling further behind China and the Middle East? Institutional history explains this reversal by 
the constant pressure of external war leaving little room for repression, inefficient states, or 
backward economic practices at home. To remain competitive in the tournament, European 
leaders were forced to give more concessions domestically or risk weakening their overall 
position. 
Thus, effects from the tournament trickled down to domestic political and economic 
institutions and resulted unexpectedly in momentum for transition to an open-access society. 
“Moving to an advanced economy requires that vigorous local rivalry develop and shift in 
character from minimizing costs and imitation to process efficiency and, ultimately, to 
innovation and differentiation” (Porter 2000, p. 19). Rulers needed to allow freedoms to unleash 
economic dynamism and reach the levels of economic production necessary to compete 
externally. This was not necessarily done consciously, but if rulers tried to have it both ways 
(more domestic resources and absolute power) they would either fail to extract sufficient 
resources to avoid losing the tournament, or they would face revolt from those groups. 
In comparison to the rest of human history, momentum for develop built incredibly fast. 
All this investment in war drove gains in productivity, technology, and a wide-range of social 
innovations. Countries would copy the discoveries of opponents, thereby spreading development. 
For example, England and Prussia were quick to adopt aspects of organizational innovations that 
proved so effective for Spanish “Tercio” infantry units (Hoffman 2015, p. 40). Even healthcare 
advances were made. Not out of moral considerations, but because it was far cheaper to cure a 
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wounded veteran than to find, train, and integrate a replacement (p. 37). Military service also 
allowed deserving individuals in terms of fighting, leadership, or innovation to aspire to noble 
status (p. 25). At first much investment gains were made in “learning by doing.” Then research 
and science took off around 1800.  
When relative peace and growing urbanization came to Europe in the nineteenth century, 
the tournament focus turned to empire building, which quickly resulted in major transportation 
innovations. Europe is not unique, however, in facing violent conflict for long periods of its 
history. If Russia and many other countries also engaged in nearly constant conflict, how is it 
that they did not reach the same results? The incentives leaders faced were different. In most 
areas, war was an all or nothing game. If you were a ruler and lost, your country would be 
occupied and you were deposed and probably killed. Alternatively, in areas with one unified and 
overwhelming power (e.g. Russia across much of Central Asia after 1600), the powerful ruler 
could allocate less effort to fighting external wars than maintaining absolute control domestically 
and still be successful. The incentives European leaders faced bridged these two extremes. They 
exerted tremendous effort to winning, but at the same time it was not an all or nothing game. 
Other than civil wars, defeat almost never ended in toppling the losing monarch. Hoffman 
provides very interesting data along this point (p. 27). Ruler turnover after losing a war was, at 
its highest, 50% in Netherlands and Sweden. Every other European country was at or below 25% 
and for long periods no ruler was deposed in Great Britain except in civil war.  
Europe dealt with just enough pressure from the violence channel to change elites’ 
economic calculus. In contrast, early Russia had little chance at defense against the great Mongol 
horde. Then for two centuries, it fell under the broad Mongol security blanket before switching 
places in a relatively short period to become the Eurasian hegemon. Russia did engage in the 
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European tournament, but in a more sporadic fashion with widely varying effect. Gradual, 
continuous change was never a characteristic of Russian participation in the tournament. 
Domestic unrest as well took more extreme form. For example, the Bolsheviks were greatly 
empowered by Russia’s involvement in World War I.  
Institutional Decay and Entrenchment  
Institutional transition is often described in a progressive manner, but not all transition is 
forward moving. The durability characteristic described earlier can serve to conserve inefficient 
and even extractive institutions in several complimentary ways. First, inefficient institutions can 
survive for a long time because groups with a stake in institutional change fail to get organized 
and solve their collective action problem (Roland 2008). Another reason AJR (2005) term the 
commitment problem is that political reforms will not be enforced once the transient political 
power of an organized group dissipates. Finally, there is potential for “cognitive dissonance” 
Fukuyama attributes to cultural factors. In this case society’s very ability to perceive failure is 
clouded. Throughout history, backwards societies or losers in conflict often blame “inadequate 
observance of religious obligations” as the reason for defeat rather than some other structural 
deficiency. In extreme cases, it could be some of those very obligation that resulted in failure.  
A millennium ago, the Middle East was second only to China in terms of economic 
development. It was definitely more developed than Europe. Kuran (2008) argues that certain 
legal practices common in the Middle East contributed to the regions subsequent backwardness 
after the great reversal. For example, the waqf, which funded public goods and buildings for the 
community, was very inflexible and difficult to coordinate at a larger economic scale. 
Inheritance was also distributed among all relatives rather than the oldest heir (similar to custom 
in Rus’ before Muscovy broke with this tradition). This created a system where it was difficult to 
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accumulate capital and successful businesses tended to fragment after death because of the 
power struggle among relatives. Lastly, certain elements of contract law under Islam favored 
agreements between a small number of parties. Therefore, while the West started to develop 
huge enterprises and early corporations with hundreds to thousands of employees and 
shareholders, smallness of enterprise was a long-lived phenomenon in the Middle East. 
There is a possible pressure worse than conservation: institutional decay is also very real. 
Fukuyama (2011) in particular emphasizes that the dynamic process by which competition 
among institutions produces political development can also result in political decay —where 
decay means the system becomes less institutionalized (p. 452). Researchers have identified that 
this is particularly true if elites or external shocks are able to undermine economic institutions 
and divert transition into a negative spiral downward. “No government that has eliminated 
economic freedom has been able to attain or keep democracy, probably because, when all 
economic life is absorbed into government, there is no conceivable financial base for opposition” 
(Fish and Choudhry 2007, p. 7). It is potentially threatening to the open-access equilibrium if 
popular opinion turns against the free market or if the state is able to operate in what one could 
describe at a best as an opaque rule of law system. In post-1991 Russia, both cases are true.  
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IV. The Sophisticated Natural State 
“A living culture cannot constitute a repetition of the past; it always gives rise to 
structurally and functionally new systems and texts. But it cannot fail to contain within 
itself a memory of the past.” 
Lotman and Andrevitch, 1985 
 
Notwithstanding several brief periods of widespread unrest and complete political 
turnover, historians find that Russian political history is cyclical. Hosking (2001) opens Russia 
and the Russians by highlighting how Russia is one of history’s great survivors, existing in one 
form or another for more than a thousand years —and most of that time being the largest 
territorial power. Once the Grand Duchy of Muscovy emerged to liberate Russians from the so-
called “Tartar yoke,” political life is a long story of repression followed by temporary triumph, 
which turns out to be a façade as new eras of restraint and subjugation take hold. The same is 
true today. “Russia’s problem today is not that it has suffered from corruption, but that it has re-
embraced the Muscovite system, which for more than 500 years has not only institutionalized 
corruption, but marginalized democracy, markets, and the rule of law” (Rosefielde spring 2005). 
Under our framework, only open-access societies can unleash “institutionalization.” 
Kinships and personal trust dominate social interaction in the natural state, which is in turn 
crippling for long-run economic development. Yet, Russia differs from most countries that fall 
into the natural state category. An underachiever in political measures for its level of economic 
development, Russia is also a military superpower with high levels of human capital (Fish 2005, 
p. 103). It turns out that the natural state has much more flexibility for institutionalization than 
previously thought (even if it is sub-optimal institutionalization). This supports the idea that 
countries “develop substitute mechanisms” (La Porta et al. 1998). Our updated cycle in figure 5 
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conceptualizes this with changes in economic development now failing to affect the power 
dynamic whether it is directly or through social beliefs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian institutionalization is a complex and very much planned balance. Political elite 
use strategic pressure in both the social and violence channels to entrench the status quo political 
institutions that enrich them whether it be through intense media drives or subtle coercion by the 
police. They are able to bring in some of the advantages of open access to increase economic 
outcomes without risking significant changes to the power dynamic. If elites realize that they 
have gone too far with liberalization, they will abruptly reverse tact and clamp down on free 
association. This clamp down, however, is not limited to the typical direct physical oppression 
common for centuries. Rather, the Kremlin has a diverse toolkit combining propaganda, physical 
force, and twisted use of law. Tax law in particular is a favorite tool. For example, The Kremlin 
brought in elements from all areas of its toolkit in the takedown of Hermitage Capital and death 
  
47 
 
of Sergei Magnitsky (see Neuman 2013).  Rosefielde (spring 2005) calls it a “more sophisticated 
approach than the Western open-access model; The Kremlin does not pretend that there are such 
Lockean social contract rights and realities. They are master opportunists who exploit reality and 
illusion for their own advantage and are contemptuous of those who fail in their sophisticated 
game” (p. 293). 
Figure 6 depicts why this difference matters. EE is the economic possibilities frontier. PP 
is the political transformation frontier, defined as the economic outcomes achievable by elites 
pre-institutionalization. “Golden eggs” is when both citizens and elites benefit, so no tradeoff 
between economic efficiency and political redistribution exists. Elites avoid efficient policies 
because they are worried it will negate their power and therefore attempt to stop political change 
at the status quo S1, which is far inside the total economic potential. Now imagine elites were 
able to change their political transformation frontier, shifting it up and right as depicted by curve 
RR and the new status quo S2. This results in a number of important changes. First, the economy 
moves slightly closer to the economic frontier, allowing elites to capture more rent and citizens 
more income. Second, relative power remains roughly unchanged. Lastly, the stakes are now 
higher, which makes sense in light of Russia’s violent transitions.  
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Elites will consider what they are maximizing, how the world works, and what tools are 
at their disposal (Rodrik 2014). If outcomes are determined by distribution conflict in addition to 
interests, elites will “innovate and manipulate” the rent-seeking systems they can put in place 
just as actors do in an open-access system. Most rent‐sharing arrangements under stable 
authoritarian governments tend to have three parties: the dictator, the leadership of the organized 
group that can sanction him, and a group of investors who generate a stream of rents in privately 
owned enterprises (Haber 2008, p. 701). Sometimes, pressure can lead to manipulations that are 
in fact liberalizing. For example, Deng Xiaoping carefully decollectivized parts of the economy 
and it turned out to be a huge win for the Communist Party’s political power (Roland 2008). This 
is not always the case, however. As Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize, it is not always in the 
interest of those in power to liberalize, even if it would be good for the country as a whole. 
Figure 6: “Redistribution, Inefficiency, and the Political Transformation Frontier” (Adjusted 
from Rodrik 2014) 
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Gerschenkron (1955) points out the different impacts mercantilism had in the West versus in 
Russia. In the former case post-serfdom, it led to a rise of a new capitalist class whereas in the 
latter case still-present serfdom became “an essential wheel in the mechanism of mercantilist 
politics” (p. 12). External pressure led to the strengthening of extractive institutions rather than 
the opposite effect in this case. In other words, not necessarily purely decay or conservation, but 
some version of perverted development. 
What kind of institutions act like this in modern Russia? The “blat” culture of favors, 
which in Western eyes looks like corruption, is one example.  Another is a more flexible concept 
of rule of law that changes with temporary needs: “violation of the law is a necessary element in 
the law's own functioning: one does not exist without the other . . . given a system so distorted, 
violating the law is often the only possible way of asserting legality” (Pastukhov 2002, p. 67). 
Such a system ensures that the weak will always be vulnerable to the strong. In this sophisticated 
natural state, corruption is accepted as an unpleasant fact of life. Natalia Zorkina, one of the 
original researchers at Russia’s Levada Center, noted, “In Russia, people have completely 
decoupled themselves from the political process. They don’t believe that they can change 
anything. Even in the 1990s, only a tiny proportion of people, perhaps 2 or 3 percent, were 
politically active. Now it is even less” (Matthews 2016). Once such a framework of lawlessness 
is normalized with no “bright line” holding elites back, nonelites lose a valuable inflection point 
for revolution. State behavior in Russia, which many citizens in Western counties find appalling, 
is nothing new for Russians.      
A secondary effect of institutionalizing the natural state is that it sets the stage for a new 
state to “sit in the place of the previous” by adopting the same power structure. Fukuyama’s 
political decay theory holds that eventually, every state will face turnover since elite will make 
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mistakes. Russia specifically has a tendency to “seek extreme solutions to problems and to lurch 
from one set of cultural patterns to their diametrical opposite. In each case the new was presented 
as the complete supplanting of the old, the dismissal of absolute evil and the introduction of 
absolute good” (Hosking, 2001). Yet, each new state from Muscovy to the Bolsheviks has 
eventually adopted a similar, authoritarian institutional structure. Rather than reflecting 
fundamental transitions in economic institutions and long-term power distributions, these 
revolutions acted as transitory fluctuations of political power that led to a new set of elites 
establishing themselves in the seats of the old. Fish (2005) notes his shock as Russia transitioned 
to a new elite by “the absence of discussion of a parliamentary alternative . . . nearly everyone 
assumed that the new constitution would include a powerful president” (p. 220). Following 
collapse in 1991, despite brief support for prescribed market reforms and privatization, the 
contest over resources largely took place with hired mercenaries. Violence reigned and 
unsurprisingly the strong continue to reign up to today. By now, it should be increasingly clear 
that the question is not necessarily imperialism, communism, or capitalism. Rather, it is 
liberalism versus authoritarianism, open versus closed societies, exclusive economic structures 
versus inclusive.  
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V. Critical Influences of Institutional Development in Russia 
Chronology of Major Eras 
 Early Rus’: 800-1240 
 Arrival of Christianity: 988 
 Mongol Rule: 1240-1480 
 Muscovite Russia: 1460-1689 
 Imperial Russia: 1689-1917 
 Soviet Russia: 1917-1991 
 Kremlin Russia: 1991-present 
 
Listing specific historical events that led to transition (or entrenchment) of Russian 
institutions is a complicated, interdependent process. Rather than outlining events 
chronologically, I place them into several broadly outlined groups based on where they most 
accurately affect the institutional cycle in Figure 4. Fundamental institutional change may have 
lasting effects centuries after it started while a failed set of policies several years ago are all but 
forgotten and obsolete. The importance of rule of law, property rights, and other economic 
institutions basic to modern political order and economic outcomes is the well-established 
answer to the question “why some societies are much poorer than others” (Acemoglu et al. 2005; 
Fukuyama 2011). Our framework in section III is that countries reach such divergence in 
economic institutions due to political factors over time. The next step therefore is to understand 
why a country reaches a distribution of power; for us that means tracing Russia’s historical path 
to its current “sophisticated natural state.” This exercise is best done in two distinct phases as 
illustrated in Figure 7. In the initial formation of the sophisticated state, shocks from Mongol 
occupation and the spread of Orthodoxy combine with the unique cultural and geographical 
setting already present to form a set of extractive institutions unique to the Russian case: 
collectivized notions of rule of law and property, serfdom, and rent-sharing authoritarianism that 
took the expression of “local Tsars.” In the second phase, shocks from the Bolshevik revolution, 
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World War II, and the 90s economic crisis crushed any nascent middle class with the resulting 
side effect of failed transition. Thus, institutions that look very similar in key aspects to those 
that emerged centuries earlier remain in place centuries into the future. 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1: Initial Setting of the Natural State 
The Slavs entered history suddenly, besieging Constantinople itself in 626 with the 
Avars, a Mongol people (Hosking 2001, p. 29). They settled across Eastern Europe over the next 
two centuries and adopted relatively advanced Roman agriculture. The next major demographic 
shift occurred when the Rus’, originally Scandinavian Vikings, ventured south later from areas 
of high population growth and limited arable land. By the middle of the ninth century, the clan-
based Rus’ kaganate had developed into a powerful force. Around this time the Rus’ adopted a 
more settled life, but communal characteristics such as strong clans, communes, and local 
assemblies remained prevalent. From what we know of the region, early economic development 
broke down into “inner” agricultural peoples and “outer” herders, wanderers, and raiders. The 
agricultural people lived in the more European part of Russia, inside the Ural Mountains, in 
mainly forested “nonblack soil” regions with sufficient rainfall. The herders lived mainly in the 
steppe. Herding dominated the black soil region, despite it being more fertile with a longer 
growing season, because of low rainfall levels. Economic interaction between inner and outer 
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people often turned violent because outer people had little to offer besides animal products the 
agriculturalists could already produce. This dichotomy constrained Russian culture for a long 
time (Kahan 1989, p. 7). But they also would cooperate at times as we see recorded when Even 
for inner people, early agriculture in Russia was more risk prone than elsewhere in Europe. 
Rainfall was highly variable, threats from the steppe were present, and the growing season was 
often shorter. Haber’s (2012) argument is that in these more risk-prone environments, farmers 
needed more centralized institutions in order to set aside storage. “In short, they had incentives to 
support a powerful state designed to insure against systemic risk, rather than a limited state 
designed to protect transactions— Pharaonic Egypt perhaps being the archetype” (p. 25).  
While rainfall in early regions of Russia was much closer to that in the West than Egypt, 
risks ought to be taken in sum rather than only based on rainfall. Using this method, a very 
similar story is clear in early history of the region. Peasants developed a number of unique 
coping mechanism to deal with the combination of the agricultural and geostrategic challenges. 
Forms of the peasant commune appeared very early on. In fact, it was a common institution 
before princes even had begun to gain power (Illyin 2015, p. 61-62). These communes developed 
“joint responsibility” in order to address highly variable risk of their environment. Paradoxically, 
high-risk had a dis-incentivizing influence on Rus’ people. They were disinclined to plan ahead 
in a calculated, steady manner because the risks were deemed so variable that it was more worth 
it to survive as best they could in the short term and look to good fortune to help them, while 
always fearing that “evil spirits” would strike at any time (Hosking 2001, p. 15). An invasion of 
large magnitude or agricultural shock past a certain threshold is beyond what attainable 
preparation could insure.  
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Russian leaders have always stated unambiguously “Russia is a European country” 
(Migranyan 2015, p. 17). At least in terms of early Russian history, this is hardly the case. 
Throughout European history as far back as William I’s invasion of England in 1066, 
innovations in economic, political, and military life had started in one region and then spread to 
others through conquest, social exchange, or imperial rule. Russia was blocked from this process 
initially on geographical reasons and later on authoritarianism became a significant challenge as 
well. As Hosking (2001 p. 21) points out, for most of her early developmental centuries, Russia 
was more an Asiatic country than a European one.  
Even after Russian Tsars had begun to turn West, geography continued to play some role 
in forming political institutions. It was considerably more difficult for new European ideas and 
institutions to spread into Russia’s vast continental expanse. Additionally, the predominant view 
was that unless the entire Russian heartland and all major approaches was occupied, its frontiers 
were open and vulnerable to attack from an unknown approach. In establishing economic 
institutions, the composition of land, physical, and human capital all matter and in terms of 
comparison, Russia is as different from England as possible. “Bigness” in development first was 
key in the formation of rent seeking, which tied labor to abundant land in the form of serfdom. 
As Russia expanded rapidly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, peasants migrated away 
from elite held lands in order to evade taxes, control, and seek their own freedom. Under 
pressure from the landed elite who formed the military power and civil servants he could draw 
from, peasants were gradually enserfed to the land to prevent migration. Later, growing Western 
European demand for grain in the nineteenth century ensured a longer life for serfdom after the 
initial stimulus under the land-labor ratio began to dissipate (Kahan 1989, p. 155). Past that, 
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Gerschenkron (1995) argues that Russia’s enormous size contributed to the tendency of 
industrialization to happen in rapid spurts or not at all rather than at a steady pace (p. 14).  
External Shocks 
Muscovy’s rise to prominence and domination over Russia is inherently intertwined with 
two long since vanished great powers: The Mongols and Byzantines. The Byzantine 
missionaries, Cyril and Metodius, had a huge impact on the arc of Russian in the early tenth 
century by mastering Slavonic, devising a written alphabet for it (thus the Cyrillic alphabet’s 
similarity to Greek), and eventually establishing a new patriarchate in 927. Several decades later, 
Vladimir adopted Orthodox Christianity as the state religion after considering Islam and Roman 
Catholicism as well (Hosking 2001, p. 37). Greek influence was strong during this period as 
artisans and clergy alike built up civilization in Rus’ until local inhabitants gradually replaced 
them. For the greater majority of two centuries leading up to initial conflicts with the Mongols, 
the area was by no means united into what we now know as “Russia.” A state of instability and 
feuding between princes, not unlike that seen in elsewhere in Europe, was the dominant 
framework of social structure.  
In 1222, a new and powerful enemy appeared on the steppes. After a successful invasion 
of the Caucasus, the Mongols first invaded Russia for a very brief period in the same year. They 
were largely successful in a few smaller battles against ruling princes, but disappeared into the 
steppe again without taking over control. Despite this new outside threat, Russia remained 
divided between many competing princes. Russian historians often point to division as the cause 
of the Mongols eventual success. In truth, nothing at the time would have enabled the Russian 
princes to withstand the Mongol juggernaut of 1237-1240. Nor, at any time during the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, could Russia have overcome the Golden Horde. Fueled by efficient tax 
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collection and control of key trade routes, the Mongols boasted a powerful balance of a huge 
nomadic army and an urbanized bureaucracy. No matter how efficient the state became or what 
calculus elites made, Russia would be overrun if the Mongols decided to do so. This was much 
different from the setting of war in Western Europe under Hoffman’s model. Even over two 
centuries later, Russia had little to do with the eventual collapse of the Golden Horde (Halperin 
1985, p. 32). It is unsurprising therefore, that swift campaigns by Genghis’ grandson Batu 
devasted Rus’. Many historians theorize that only the demise of Batu’s father, which caused him 
to return to the capital, saved other major parts of Europe from destruction (Halperin 1985, p. 
47).  
The “Pax Monglica” had enormous destructive costs, but it also made significant 
contributions to the political institutions, economic development, and cultural diversity of many 
lands under Mongol control. Russia was a unique case compared to other Mongol territories; it 
remained largely unoccupied because it had little to offer. It was neither steppe, nor located on 
important trade routes. To Russians, taxes may have seemed heavy, but for the Mongols it was a 
relatively insignificant source of revenue compared to rich trade routes to the south. At the same 
time, Russia was also too close to the steppe for its own good. Even the most remote Russian city 
was within easy striking distance. Thus, the Tartars were able to control Russia easily without 
direct occupation for as long as conditions on the steppe were favorable (Halperin 1985, p. 31). 
The Golden Horde relaxed control after its initial devastation of the area, allowing Rus’ princes 
to take over the role of tribute collector and administrator (Hosking 2001, p. 55). This system 
would remain in place for two centuries, creating a competition between local princes over who 
would serve in the role of the horde’s agent. This light hand had benefits: lower cost of security, 
protection from potentially more destructive conflicts, and contact with the broader Pax 
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Monglica world. It had one significant and lasting negative effect as well. It unified Russia under 
a central institutional system focused on rent extraction for Tartar overlords. The agent-patron 
relationship, incentives, and institutions in this case are strikingly similar to what Europeans 
would employ in South America centuries later, which resulted in similar harmful long-term 
effects as in Russia when compared to the inclusive institutions they brought to North America 
(AJR 2001).  
The Tartars practiced thoroughgoing religious toleration, this even extended to taxation. 
Temples and churches were all granted tarkhan, a charter of immunity from tribute and other fees 
(Hosking 2001, p. 50). While introduced several centuries earlier, the countryside was still 
largely pagan throughout Rus’. It was during the Mongol period in the fourteenth century that the 
Church really thrived and began to make inroads among the broader population —in part thanks 
to favorable tax privileges and security. Orthodoxy was also seen as a way to push back at 
Mongol overlords, becoming not only a religious identity but also a national identity and symbol 
of political unity. This newfound popularity gave the Orthodox Church unifying power across 
social classes, which over time became so powerful that “insofar as paganism was thought of as 
non-Orthodoxy, non-Orthodoxy began to be thought of as paganism” (Lotman and Andrevitch 
1985, p. 41). Despite growing social pushback, once Muscovy rose, its civil and military 
institutions were largely Mongol in origin (e.g. military strategy and armament, taxation, state 
customs, and communication systems to name a few). This left the Church and Orthodox 
bookmen trying to modify or deny accounts of Mongol influence. As it spread, Orthodoxy 
affected primarily xenophobic and anti-materialist social norms, but it also contributed in part to 
authoritarianism and the lack of rule of law. 
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It is probably more accurate to speak of a Muscovite world today than anything else. 
Nobody would have predicted the rise of Moscow in Rus’. The small state was not mentioned in 
historical texts until 1147. Moscow’s expansion and eventual primacy in the second half of the 
fourtheenth century was deeply connected to its relationship and positioning relative to the 
Golden Horde, its geographic location, and adoption of seemingly small institutional changes. 
Previously, Tver was the strongest principality and given what was known as the throne of 
Vladimir, which essentially meant it was the primary agent under the Golden Horde. However, 
Muscovy was able to wrestle the title from Tver due its friendlier position with the Golden Horde 
(Halperin 1985). Muscovy developed a special relationship with the Mongols and more often 
than not worked alongside Tartars rather than against them. This was reinforced when Moscow 
aligned itself with the Golden Horde against the threat of Lithuania. “Moscow had allied itself 
with the Mongols when the Golden Horde was strongest and then seized more autonomy when 
the Horde faltered . . . Moscow came out on top not because its princes were more ruthless or 
craven but because they were shrewder politicians” (Halperin 1985, p. 88). Hosking (2001) 
points to Muscovy’s unique capacity for endurance and ability to wait for long periods until its 
opponents weakened (p. 6).  
Random campaigns into Russia by various steppe clans in the early fifteenth century 
signaled enfeeblement of the Golden Horde. Tamerlane had sacked the Horde’s capital slightly 
earlier in a major struggle and rerouted caravans of Asian goods south so as to bypass the Horde 
and by the middle of the fifteenth century Mongol influence was fragmented permanently 
(Halperin 1985, p. 29). In an interesting turn of events, Muscovy faced off a Tartar army in 1480 
without a pitched battle. Little did they know that it was to be the last major invasion of the 
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steppe into Russia. The tides of history would reverse in the other direction. More warfare, in the 
post-Mongol period, eventually decided the outcome in favor of Muscovy. 
Muscovy’s rise not only coincided with the decline of Mongol power, but also with 
significant changes in the distribution of Orthodox power. As mentioned, Orthodoxy in Russia 
had grown mainly while still under direct Tartar influence. This system signaled the beginnings 
of duality. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Church’s ideology was in place, the Mongols 
were the enemy and to be resisted. At the same time that the “Tatar yoke” first appeared under 
Orthodox bookmen depicting Russian princes leading brave resistance, those same princes were 
assimilating Tatars into key roles in the military and administration in large numbers (Ostrowski 
1998, p. 248).  
Around 1440, the Rus’ Church began to operate virtually autonomous. In 1448 Muscovy 
effectively declared itself its own patriarchate. This rise of Orthodoxy in Russia coincided with 
the fall of Byzantium in 1453 when the Turks successful sieged Constantinople. While this was a 
huge loss of an external spiritual anchor viewed as the source of true religion, Russians thought 
the Byzantium Empire had fallen because of its sins (Constantinople had reversed course and 
appealed to Rome prior to its fall). Muscovy was therefore suddenly thrust into position of 
responsibility for the whole of “right-thinking” Christendom at the very time it was seeking a 
new basis for its own statehood. The muscovite ruler replaced the Byzantine basileus as the 
protector of the Church. Thus, creation of a virtual past now included the Tartar yoke and 
Muscovy as the true inheritor of Kievan Rus’ as well as of Byzantium (Ostrowski 1998, p. 142). 
In this way, the churched helped establish the preeminence of Moscow in the Russian world.  
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Formation of Muscovite Institutions 
At first, Muscovite rulers occupied an ambiguous space, unsure what strategic role to 
take. It was not until 1547 at the coronation of Ivan IV that the term tsar (basileus, emperor) was 
officially first used by the court; but even then, it was unclear if that meant basileus or Chinizid 
khan (Hosking 2001, p. 85). Nevertheless, Muscovy steadily consolidated the non-steppe areas 
of Russia. Near the end of the fifteenth century, it defeated Novgorod and absorbed it into 
Muscovy by weakening the independence of the Church and other institutions. The Muscovite 
Tsar started to serve a dual role over church and state, thereby eliminating a traditional bulwark 
against the concentration of power. Part of Muscovy’s success during this period in unifying 
northeastern Russia is due to its adoption of Mongol military and administrative methods. One 
key break with Kievan tradition dealt with inheritance, which now went to individuals rather 
than to the dynasty as a whole (Hosking 2001, p. 72). Another dealt with land ownership in 
general. The Mongols had adopted the Chinese principle that the land belonged ultimately to the 
ruler, which they brought westward. Muscovite grand princes eventually adopted this principle 
too, breaking with the Kievan Rus’ mold that gave title over land to the boyars (Ostrowski 1998 
p. 47). Muscovy continued its momentum, defeating Kazan, the strongest Golden Horde 
successor, in 1552. This victory brought control over nearly all the European area of Russia as 
well as the Volga and the trade routes it was critical for. Thus, by 1600 Muscovy had expanded 
into the Caucasus and most of its Western Empire. By 1700, it tripled in terms of territory, 
enveloping huge areas in the East all the way to China and the Pacific. 
Soon after the collapse of Tartar control, Russia integrated where Europe remained 
divided. The Muscovite Tsar emerged as the sole authority over both church and state, whereas 
in Western Europe other agencies gained prominence. Geography alone does not explain why 
Europe was fragmented and Russia was not. Prior to Mongol invasion and for most of its control, 
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Russia was also fragmented with no signs that this would change. The Great Man theory also is 
not a satisfying explanation because unlike Alexander the Great, Napoleon, or other great empire 
builders, Muscovy’s rise and subsequent control was not dependent on one individual. It was 
consistent for centuries, under both powerful and weak leaders. Granted, leaders like Ivan the 
Terrible, Catherine, and Peter accelerated and strengthened centralization, but they are not the 
root cause. Institutions make more sense in this case because they are the only thing that explain 
both the timing of the rise of authoritarianism and central control over Russia as well as its 
durability. Hoffman (2015) points out that both China and Russia ended up strongly united after 
centuries of Mongol control. Although there are serious differences between the two countries, a 
distinct parallel is the shared institutional system developed at least in part due to Mongol 
influence. 
In no other European country did government play as prominent a role in so many 
aspects of life as in the case of the growing Russian power. Especially in light of its huge 
expanse, the state could not control everything, but it did develop an unquestionable and 
immense authority. “This [distinct authoritarianism] was a major element of the Muscovite 
heritage” (Kahan 1985, p. 2). As North et al. (2009) predict, during the progression of a natural 
state, the elite expand their circle of support by the exchange of rent for services (e.g. English 
crown-granted monopolies in the form of “estates”). Russia adopted a similar, yet even more 
rigid system that granted absolute power to the Tsar: 
Russian authoritarianism, at least since the rise of Muscovy under Ivan the Great in the 
15th century, has been predicated on rent granting (the obverse of rent seeking) rather 
than inalienable property and the rule of contract law. Unlike its Western counterparts, it 
has been a patrimonial society, where the ruler owned all he surveyed, and granted 
(pomestie) his supporters "kormlenie" (feeding troughs) in return for state service 
(Rosefielde, spring 2005). 
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The Tsar even had power to arbitrarily reverse grants. England, in contrast, created more laws 
surrounding its similar system early on. The Magna Carta, for instance, gave more protections to 
the church and barons. The Russian term for state, “gosudarstvo,” means literally “lordship,” and 
does not distinguish ownership from political authority (Hosking 2001, p. 91). Thus Muscovy’s 
patron-client relationships were unique for their cohesive structures at both the apex and the base 
of society with weak, formally absent institutions in-between. The result was a personal state 
antithetical to development of consistent rule of law.  
Authoritarianism in Russia arose from domestic considerations and drew the majority of 
its moral and cultural basis from Byzantium rather than Sarai. Still, just as Moscow availed itself 
of Mongol institutions, Muscovite autocrats made the Mongol imperial tradition serve their 
purposes. Part of this was conscious decision in light of completion with other principalities for 
dominance, and part was likely just maintaining the status quo that the Tartars had enforced for 
two and a half centuries. Adoption of Mongol institutions both formal and informal gave 
significant power to the emerging Muscovite system. It was significantly more efficient in war, 
tax collection, and administration than any of its competitors in Russia or the steppe.  
A more specific institution that emerged during Muscovy’s expansion and served to 
enable Russian authoritarianism was serfdom. As discussed in section IV, the goal of the natural 
state is ultimately control; this was an increasing challenge, as the Tsar’s imperial ambitions 
required the ability to command more power. In response, the state expanded the class of 
servitors (elites granted land in return for service to the Tsar). As the Tsar succeeded in 
expanding territory with the help of his servitors, this ironically created a new problem for them: 
peasant migration. Peasants left servitor land for new areas in order to avoid tax collections, 
control, and generally seek opportunities not available to them elsewhere. Russia therefore faced 
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a significantly different land/labor ratio than other European countries, which meant that labor 
was more important for rents than land. Because authoritarianism was already largely 
unrestrained, it was not particularly difficult for the Tsar and elites to begin to arbitrarily tie 
peasants to land. This example contrasts significantly with what would happen several centuries 
later in another huge territorial expanse, North America. Many settlers who originally left 
Western Europe to cross the Atlantic, or continued pushing West later on, were responding to 
similar circumstances as Russian peasants. What allowed the difference in results? In a way, the 
English attempted to institute a slightly more extractive system following its costly Seven Years 
War with France, but it was already far too late to enforce such a system. There were several key 
differences in this case: the harsher climate had led to a more communal system in Russia from a 
very early period, there was central Orthodox imperative connected closely and legitimizing the 
state, and finally Mongol occupation had left Muscovy with a legacy of extractive institutions the 
Tsar quickly modified to his own purpose.   
Economists often assume that serfdom or slavery will naturally disappear because of the 
inherent superiority of free labor and the greater incentives for production it brings (Domar 1970, 
p. 2.) Indeed, without serfdom Russia would have been much more economically efficient even 
early on (refer back to Figure 6), but it also would have been impossible for the Tsar to 
centralize power under his control. Serfdom was ineffective at sparking productivity. What it 
was highly effective at was distributing economic privileges and control to servitors in return for 
taxes and military support. Revolutions of the type seen in England never occurred because of 
barriers to both the landholder and serf classes. As we know, dissatisfied barons and other 
middle-elite drove early reforms in Western Europe. The conditions for Russian property owners 
or serfs we identified in section three never existed (collective action to gain transitory power, 
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political reform to institutionalize that power, and corresponding change in economic 
institutions). Overall, the servitors were happy with their expansive power under the Tsar. Thus, 
if the Tsar removed one servitor for any stated reason, the rest viewed this more as a political 
reality based in the Tsar’s supreme authority than a violation of law. For everyone else, the costs 
of collective action were extremely high due to geographic remoteness, instant repression, and 
powerful cultural support of the Tsar from both Orthodoxy and Russia’s collectivist heritage. 
What little protest did occur was even counterproductive. For example, the “Salt Riot” in 1648 
resulted in the “Sobornoye Ulozheniye” or assembly of land, which codified serfdom and other 
extractive institutions. 
An interesting exercise that highlights some of the characteristics of economic 
institutions in Russia is comparing the systems surrounding serfdom in Russia to those in 
England. Dennison (2014) notes that a striking feature of serfdom in England is that there really 
was something like a coherent and consistent state law. While Russia is authoritarian, England 
was actually much more centralized. Serf owners in Russia were the equivalent of mini-Tsars, 
exercising absolute authority in their domain, a kind of de-centralization of absolutism. Dennison 
describes how in Medieval England a system of manorial courts constrained arbitrary power 
through centralized customary law. Even if, such protection was weak early on, just the notion 
that there was some customary law is important. Few Russian landlords offered any kind of 
consistent judicial services to their serfs (Dennison 2014, p. 259). This is important in one sense 
because it directly affected the underdevelopment of rule of law in Russia. A second, less 
apparent reason is how it affected centuries of interactions for the majority of Russians. 
Oppressed Russian serfs still engaged in limited market activities, largely with each other, such 
as trade of minor goods, services, and sometimes the exchange of land. In Russia, these aspects 
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occurred in an informal, poorly enforced environment, which meant that further development 
was largely constrained. Whereas in England, individual agreements and responsibilities were 
directly enforced much early on. The serfs’ ambiguous legal status often forced them to pay 
bribes for access to goods and services they could not obtain through the formal market. In some 
cases, bribes were even noted in historical records of account books (Dennison 2014, p. 265). 
Since the central tenant of institutions is accumulating societal knowledge of how to conduct 
interactions, this underdevelopment is critically important. It points to prominent themes of the 
black market and blat in Russia under both the Soviet Union and today. Again, evidence that 
institutions today reflect long historical legacies.  
Some estimates state that Russia would have been twice as rich by 1913 had it abolished 
serfdom in 1820 instead of 1861, as was considered by Alexander I (Markevich and Zhuravskaya 
2015). We already discussed why those benefitting from this inefficiency were protected in a 
way from those who would have benefited from abolishment organizing in revolt. There is also 
the question of effects beyond initially measurable economic outcomes, 
In the process of preserving the institution intact, the serfowners not only became 
brutalized, but the whole body politic became dehumanized and permeated by elements 
of lawlessness. Thus, the changes imposed on Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century 
found neither the basic legal institutions nor the prevailing social attitudes ready to accept 
them. The political authorities were primarily responsible for the abolition of serfdom. 
And as a political act, it had to signify a break with the institutions of the past, the most 
visible and perhaps the most obnoxious symbol of which was serfdom (Kahan 1989, p. 
156). 
 
Serfdom corrupted owners, reduced production, and shaped adverse incentives for peasants to 
invest in land or their individual human capital. Often, they turned to the peasant commune as a 
way to distribute both exploitation and general riskiness of life during the time from famine to 
disease.  
  
66 
 
The third and potentially most important state institution for understanding the overall 
institutional system is the commune. Geography influenced its initial formation: the collective, as 
a relationship between the state and the commune, is traditionally responsible for famine relief 
(Kahan 1989, p. 136). Serfdom had a reinforcing effect because a system of collective 
responsibility was convenient for landlords. It minimized administrative costs by delegating 
responsibility to communal officials to allocate, collect, and deliver rents: 
The community – or commune – in Russian serf society was a formal corporate entity, 
which raised its own funds and assumed collective responsibility for a set of clearly 
defined obligations. Nearly all feudal burdens were levied collectively. Quitrents were 
assigned as a lump sum for communal officials to allocate among households. Labour 
obligations and recruitment levies were assigned in the same way, as was the state poll 
tax, for which all male serfs were assessed. Access to woodland and pasture was granted 
to the commune as a whole; rights to these resources were assigned to households by 
communal officials. Communes were responsible for selecting members to fill posts 
ranging from reeve or steward to tax collectors and constables. They were supposed to 
use their collective funds to pay these officials, and to provide relief to their poorer 
members (Dennison 2014, p. 254).  
 
This collectivization of responsibility, rights, and obligations was largely absent in England, 
where such factors were determined on an individual basis. 
If the Tsar and servitors make up the first two levels of extractive institutions in the 
natural state, their existence is built on the commune. They were dependent on the specific form 
the commune took in Russia, which continued inefficient, conflict based incentives over best 
interest. “Strong communes persisted not because they efficiently maximized the economic pie, 
but because they distributed large shares of a limited pie to village elites with fiscal, military, and 
regulatory side-benefits to rulers and overlords” (Ogilvie 2007, p. 663). This relationship is 
strikingly familiar to that a level higher between servitors and the Tsar. The key to understanding 
the sophisticated state is its personalized extraction pervasive at every level of society. The true 
source of Russia autocracy is not the all-powerful distant ruler, but the local absolutist one 
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interacts with in everyday life. Russian director Andrey Zvyagintsev’s Leviathan (2014) offers a 
vivid portrayal of personalized and local absolutism that continues to exist in Russia today. The 
film depicts a family’s struggle against not only a corrupt local mayor who eventually 
successfully expropriates their house and land, but also the broader institutional system prevalent 
in every aspect of life: Orthodoxy’s relationship to power, alcohol abuse, and social relationships 
that reinforce corruption and authoritarianism rather than uniting against it.   
Returning to the old commune, data following emancipation confirms a continuing 
negative effect for areas of strong communal power. There is no good economic explanation for 
why strong peasant communes existed stably for centuries. In North America for example, such 
systems were soon abandoned because of their inefficiency (e.g. Jamestown). Emancipation was 
not necessarily in a liberal understanding of the term because rights to land were often 
distributed as communal property rights. While emancipation did have a large and positive effect 
on agricultural productivity, land reform sometimes had a negative effect through the channel of 
increased commune power (Markevich and Zhuravskaya 2015). Just as before, communal 
regulation of land, migration, trade, and technology hindered efficient production and 
motivation.  
A fusion of early economic heritage, Mongol occupation, and new widespread Orthodoxy 
led Russians to pursue a kind of freedom very different from what representative government 
grants under the liberal model. Pravda, was the collective wisdom of the community 
accumulated over generations. While elements of this differing take on freedom existed prior to 
the introduction of Orthodoxy, the split between Roman and Greek origins illustrates the divide. 
The Greek states gave its successors philosophy, literature, poetry, art, and the first direct 
democracy while the Roman Republic contributed the first beginnings of rule of law and limited 
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government (even if the ruling class was exempt for centuries). Well into the early modern 
world, Rome and at first Constantinople, then Moscow were the cultural centers of this divide. 
French philosopher Benjamin Constant (1819) terms the divide as liberty of the ancients versus 
the moderns. The liberty precious to modern nations focuses on the individual’s right to only be 
subjected to laws and includes things like expression, freedom of movement and association, and 
some influence in administration. In contrast, “The liberty of the ancients consisted in carrying 
out collectively but directly many parts of the over-all functions of government.” Similar to 
collective responsibility and objectives of the commune, the ancients according to Constant saw 
no inconsistency between “collective freedom and the complete subjection of the individual to 
the authority of the group” (Constant 1819). The Russian model was that supreme authority of 
church and state embodied the freedom and will of the people. It implies that authority and 
people are integrated into a single body politic, “people and the party are one” (Illyin 2015, p. 
63).The individual was thus a slave to the community, while at the same time supposedly being 
truly free in the community.  
As Russia interacted more with Europe, they also came into contact with evolving 
liberalism in a large part driven by the Catholic Church, which emphasized rational, scholastic, 
and textual guidelines. The Russian understanding was fundamentally different. For example, 
Dostoevsky rejected the rational and formalistic Latin model, arguing that a view based on the 
mystical, on personal religious experience, on a higher status provided less of a menace to 
personal freedom. The irony of history is that this disorder was the worst thing for freedom 
(Newcity 1997, p. 49).  
Despite Peter’s drive to modernize Russia in a European model, Russia recoiled from 
Western liberalism and at no point really integrated key institutional aspects, both formal and 
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informal, of liberalism. Leontovitsch (2012) outlines the sad history of liberalism in Russia in his 
comprehensive work originally published in 1957. He traces the oft-neglected facts and 
arguments that generally obscure the true history of what is happening. For example,  
Take Nikolai Karamzin, the distinguished historian known for his defence of autocracy 
and advice to Alexander I to resist Mikhail Speranskii’s reform proposals. He opposed 
emancipation of the serfs and thus may look irredeemably conservative. But he did so on 
the grounds that unless the gentry’s land was in large part transferred to the peasants, 
their position would be intolerable. To move forward, he called for allowing serfs the 
legal right to acquire true property rights in land (a legal right granted only in 1848), 
which would have enabled them to develop the capacity to stand on their own without 
any need for tutelage, either by landowners or by the state (pp. 61–62).  
 
Leontovitsch explains how the development of liberalism in Russia was fatally crippled by long-
standing commitments to collectivism and paternalism. The survival of rural peasant communes 
in particular inhibited the development of a wider consciousness of liberal civil law. 
Liberalism is critical in the political realm because it not only guides norms and formal 
rules, but it also is the foundation for the spread of de facto power in any society. If individuals 
and the groups they form have vested all power in the state, they have no ability to brings 
transition or protect the basic economic institutions critical to development. Westerners often 
puzzle over the willingness of Russians to accept authority in what is, at least on its face, a 
democratic state. Such a concern is fair because one cannot both reject liberalism and accept 
democracy because doing the first is the direct path to authoritarianism. This is at odds with 
Adam Przeworski and his school of democratic thought who base it on elections and opposition. 
Such a view based on elections is only the shadow of democracy on Plato’s Cave. One has to 
examine the overall institutional system over time; “a key characteristic of a democracy is the 
continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as 
political equals” (Dahl, 1971). An open-access society, based on Constant’s modern liberalism, 
is dynamic. It balances power between competing organizations and adheres to established rule 
  
70 
 
of law. In contrast, the natural state of the ancients and of Russia today is static. It invests 
complete authority from the people to the elite who is then justified in all action.  
The impact of the mainly informal institutional history of Russia’s authoritarianism and 
Eastern concept of liberalism permeates all areas of life. Perhaps one of the most significant 
specific examples is in rule of law. La Porta et al. (1998) show legal origin is a major 
determinant of economic outcomes because some forms will lead more naturally to organizations 
and rights that are conducive to economic growth than other forms. In their first study (1998), 
they compare countries with German, Scandinavian, English, and French origins. Russia is not 
included as either its own category or under one of the others. In a later study, they trace Russian 
legal origins to French law in the nineteenth century as a largely voluntary adoption when Russia 
sought to modernize (La Porta et al. 2008, p. 290). Later, they point to socialist law. While there 
work clearly shows that rule of law affects economic outcomes, their historical explanation of 
Russian law is flawed. As shown earlier, Russia never really adopted liberalism in its push to 
modernize. Fukuyama gives a more convincing source, arguing that rule of law originates from 
religion; first as a set of norms and then gradually codified. Broadening Fukuyama’s argument to 
include factors with influence similar to religion fits well with the narrative developed in this 
paper. The Mongol invasion and split between Byzantine and Rome are “the first two of the 
reasons why the Russian legal tradition is fundamentally different from the Western legal 
tradition” (Newcity 1997, p. 47). 
These events reinforced the already present communal source of justice, responsibility, 
and freedom creating the basis for rule of law more deeply separated from the groups La Porta et 
al. identify (1998). Rule of law in the Roman sense never made inroads into Russia. Whether it is 
Tsarist Russia, Communist Russia, or Russia today under the Kremlin, a constant theme persists 
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through Russian legal thought. As Nikita Khruschev said to his prosecutor general who protested 
that the law did not allow him to put a group of people caught in black market activities to death,  
“Who’s the Boss: we or the law? We are masters over the law, not the law over us —so we have 
to change the law; we have to see to it that it is possible to execute these speculators” (Simis 
1982, p. 29-31). The use of law as a political weapon perverts the idea of equality under law. 
Pluralism rests on competing centers of power. The barons who forced the Magna Carta into 
existence were not themselves virtuous, but they kept the crown in check through rule of law by 
creating at least a basic standard. Yet, this concept has never gained traction in Russia. As Count 
Sergei Witte, and influential finance minister during Russia’s attempted industrialization at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, commented: 
 . . . the people have been systematically, over two generations brought up without a 
sense of property and legality . . . what is an empire with one hundred million peasants 
who have been educated neither in the concept of landed property nor that of the firmness 
of law in general? (Quoted in Pipes 1990).  
 
Even today and despite pressure from potential efficiency gains, public opinion has continued to 
regard individual freehold property in land as immoral.  (Hosking 2001, p. 17). Now that we 
have traced the rise of this institutional system, phase 2 outlines failed attempts at transitions and 
the unique durability of the Russian sophisticated natural state. 
Phase 2: Failed Transition, Reinforcement, and becoming the “Sophisticated State” 
As Russia joined the Europe as major imperial power, it was forced to reform over time 
in order to compete in the tournament. These reforms, however, would fail to initiate real 
transition from underlining authoritarianism and illiberalism; Russia always “stopped half-way 
between its feudal heritage and modern capitalist practices” (Sachs and Pistor 1997, p. 6). 
Development needs time, especially if countervailing institutions are already strongly in place. 
Such was the case for Russia when under Peter I it first began to open to the West. By then, 
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political and social institutions were firmly in place, creating a strong roadblock for reform. Yet, 
Muscovy was not the only country to result from invasion. The manor system eventually 
important to the development in England was put in place as early as 1066 by William the 
Conqueror in order to create an institutional system that could maintain his power (the Norman 
invasion of Europe is one of the more straightforward examples of violence-driven transition). 
England then moved from a fragile natural state gradually to a mature state with the beginnings 
of impersonal institutions governing, regulating, and enforcing property rights. It is not 
coincidental that this move occurred at the same time the British Empire started to become a 
major world power. Open society is remarkably powerful.  
Russia’s introduction to the broader competitive tournament at the start of the nineteenth 
century was both unluckily rapid and eventually overwhelming. Ever since Mongol 
disintegration, Russia had been at almost constant war, but conflict was incentivized differently 
than the European model. Not to mention Europe’s significant head start. Western Europe faced 
survival by efficiency whereas Russia used its size to overwhelm smaller states with attrition 
warfare. The Tsar’s strategy was population expansion because their military power depended on 
size to a larger extent than military technology (Kahan 1985, p. 18). This strategy worked in part 
thanks to the now unified Orthodox Russian identity as well as the centralized bureaucracy 
modified from the Mongol Empire. Then a series of costly coalition wars ending with 
Napoleon’s invasion in 1812 began to threaten Moscow’s stability. Before Napoleon, Russia had 
fought mostly with success almost exclusively against smaller regional powers (e.g. Poland and 
Sweden) as well as the waning Ottoman Empire. Even though Russia was able to retreat deep 
into its vast population and geography, this was pivotal moment of military history: Advances in 
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technology, organization, and strategy had begun to speed up in Western European states while 
Muscovite institutions blocked similar progress for fear of losing power.  
The Crimean War (1853-1856), described by Solzhenitsyn as “self-assured madness” 
(1995, p. 49), signaled the finality of this split. The Russian Empire responded to familiar 
incentives of territorial expansion, but was defeated badly and sued for peace. Russia could not 
continue to rely on personalized forms of authority, which resulted in domestic backwardness, 
and still compete internationally.  
Centrally mandate efforts to industrialize met with some success. Economic historian 
Arcadius Kahan (1989) records a number of figures showing rapid growth as Russia 
implemented Western technologies from 1860 to 1917. Notably, the value of exports increased 
tenfold, taxes sevenfold, and railway went from basically nonexistent to covering 80,000 km. 
Yet, progress in economic outcomes from borrowed technologies was not a good guide for the 
institutional system. Internal politics hovered uneasily between two incompatible systems. The 
personalized power structure was shaken and had ceded de facto power, but it was not replaced 
with the formation of rule of law and other key institutions. As a result, a growing working class 
and potential middle class did not fully materialize or share in growing production. Additionally, 
there was cultural pushback against the perceived “Europeanization” of Russia. Unfortunately, 
unfair consequences of these new economic outcomes were attributed to Western ideas than to 
lingering extractive institutions. Since the West was anti true Christianity, they saw it as 
“infidelization” (Lotman and Andrevitch 1985). Perhaps the last straw that doomed liberals 
arguing for individualism was their poor strategic track record in trying to implement reforms, 
which resulted in further negative reception. For example, from 1906 to 1914 new laws allowed 
peasants to separate their property from the commune. The problem for public opinion was that 
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many who did so were groups who foresaw a reduction in their allotments the next year. This 
was perceived as a grave injustice and only reinforced negative views of capitalism (Kingston-
Mann 1999, p. 176). 
This was also a period when the Russian government’s political and military ambitions 
came into sharp conflict with the objective of industrialization in the competition for resources. 
The Imperial Russian Army was badly beaten first in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and 
then in World War I (1914-1918). Both wars exposed technological and logistical shortcomings, 
but perhaps their biggest influence was the loss of faith in the imperial institutional system. 
Ironically, the system that replaced it, communism, was imported from the West where 
liberalism had been rejected based on that very reason. The key difference was that liberalism 
required significant institutional change at odds with deeply rooted historical legacies, whereas 
communism was largely compatible with the collectivist and authoritarian bent in Russian 
institutions. Karl Marx thought that Russia was the least susceptible to a socialist revolution 
because it was an authoritarian, agricultural nation, but this was not necessarily the case: 
[Describing Marx’s prediction] . . . events revealed he was prophetic, because Lenin's 
abolition of property rights in 1917 did not destroy anything that was real. Authoritarian 
politics remained in command. Only the formal rules of the game changed. Instead of 
noble "servitors" acting as state agents with "situational" property rights, "commissars" 
filled the same role as administrators with privileges. For westerners who could not 
fathom Muscovite realities, it seemed as if capitalism had been displaced by communism. 
But for more astute observers like Alexander Gerschenkron [1966, 270-95], the statism of 
the Bolshevik autocrats simply replaced that of the Romanovs. Everyone's shoulder was 
pressed against the wheel, without any possibility of independent action supported by 
inalienable rights. (Rosefielde spring 2005, p. 291-292).  
 
Much literature has focused on the communist century, but for our analysis of institutional 
change, there is surprisingly little of note here because important institutional systems were 
already in place. As Moore (1966) would later describe using reference to revolutions like those 
in Russia and later in China, peasant revolutions lead to communism whereas bourgeois 
  
75 
 
revolutions lead to capitalism: “No bourgeois, no democracy” (p. 418). Communism in the end 
followed in the footsteps of Russia’s authoritarian heritage.  
This period did serve to fortify extractive institutions through repression of capitalists, 
kulaks, and the enormous tolls on human capital in World War II. Moore (1966) describes how 
the kulaks in late nineteenth-century Russia fill essentially the same role as sixteenth century 
yeomen in England, yet are demonized to this day as greedy and immoral while yeomen are 
lauded as heroes (p. 110). Why were individual entrepreneurs viewed so differently? The reason 
goes back to the original institutions discussed in phase I. Self-interested, prideful, and 
individualistic yeomen or kulaks stand in direct opposition to authoritarian and collective. Those 
same qualities are also the basis of liberalism, but now a third element that attributes liberalism 
to the immoral and un-Orthodox West actually twists this to be counterproductive. The very 
thing that would bring more prosperity and freedom is rejected because it is caricatured with 
suffering. Gerschenkron (1955) describes it as “a divorce of the country’s intellectual history 
from its economic history” (p. 33). 
In section III, we identified the importance of human capital accumulation, which can be 
equivalent to building a middle class. The Soviet Union suffered catastrophic losses on this front 
first due to Stalinization and then during World War II. Stalin notoriously targeted higher 
classes, from party members to Read Army officers, for elimination. In a perverse way, he 
understood that diversified de facto power was a threat to his control, so he killed those who 
possessed it before they could collectively organize. The death toll of WWII was slightly more 
indiscriminate, but also incredibly costly. Total casualties in the Soviet Union are around 25 
million, nearly 20% of the total population. Losses for the U.S., by comparison, were about half 
a million. If you were a male born in 1923, you had as high as a 97% chance of being dead by 
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1946 (Willmott 2008). Pinpointing exactly how this massive death toll affected social transition 
is difficult, but it is reasonable to believe it would have been devastating for trying to build a 
middle class to base a transition to liberalism on. Acemoglu et al. (2007) are able to sort out 
some effects by examining the severity of Jewish persecution by region. Jewish populations 
“essentially formed the middle class” and in most areas accounted for large percentages of those 
involved in commerce, medicine, and other industry (p. 902). During WWII, the heaviest 
Holocaust persecutions occurred in Eastern Europe. Their research finds evidence of lasting 
impact on social structure and by extension economic outcomes across different regions of 
Russia. “The magnitude of some of the effects we find are large and only rationalized if the 
Holocaust unleashed a process of divergent economic, political, and social development” (p. 
943). In other words, the effects could only be as significant as they found if they had broader 
institutional implications. 
It is impossible to overlook that the Soviet Union, especially early on, recorded 
impressive economic growth as it rose to a superpower. Many Westerners long thought 
communism was the inevitable future. Indeed, it was not unpopular in the U.S. at the time to 
view the Soviet economic system as superior. Journalist Lincoln Steffens (2011) famously said, 
“I have seen the future, and it works.” Yet, the USSR was only able to stimulate convergence 
growth we have discuss earlier. There is some evidence that control offered in authoritative 
regimes can allocate capital to produce higher growth rates temporarily, but eventually real 
benefits provided by individualism are more important and stable. Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2016) identify that “the benefits of individualism affect the output growth rate while the costs of 
individualism affect the level of output. In the long-run, the former effect, which is dynamic, 
should thus dominate the latter effect, which is static.” Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) point out 
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a similar relationship, concluding that eventually extractive institutions run out of easy gains 
resulting in institutional collapse (p. 124). 
Following the Soviet Union’s inevitable collapse in 1991, a slightly different story played 
out, but with largely the same results as in 1917. Increased support for liberalism proved to be 
fleeting as the economy entered a deep recession, the general population suffered, and rule of 
law ignored by the strong at the expense of the weak. This was unfairly blamed on Western 
institutions, both political and economic. Natkhov and Polischuk (2017) follow this dramatic 
change in the public mood and outline a reversal to “survival values” (p. 43). The solution was a 
return to the personalized state. All levels of economic life depend on the state. “The degree of 
this dependence only increases with time, since the solution to virtually all social problems 
occurs, one way or another, with the participation of federal or city administrations” (Pastukhov 
2002, p. 72). Even at the outset, outside political commentators were disturbed by presumptions 
of a strong presidency and this became especially true following the constitutional choice to 
move away from legislative power in 1992 and 1993 political power struggles (Fish 2005). 
Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that Putin has restored, and even strengthened, the 
Russian power vertical first traced back centuries ago. 
Surveys show that 70% of Russians say breakup of the Soviet Union was a bad thing 
(Poushter 2015). Even Solzhenitsyn, an outspoken critic of the Soviet Union, takes a 
compromised position focused on “Russians,” “the breakup occurred mechanically along false 
Lenninist borders, usurping from us entire Russian provinces. In several days we lost 25 million 
ethnic Russians —18% of our entire nation” (1995, p. 90). Russian elite use deep cultural 
memory of very real trauma brought on by external threats from the Mongols to WWII to build a 
new virtual reality. As Solzhenitsyn continues, “The active interest of many Western politicians 
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in the weakness of Russia and in her continued fragmentation is beyond doubt” (Solzhenitsyn 
1995, p. 96). Today, according to Natalia Zorkina, one of the founders of the independent 
sociological research organization the Levada Center, elite have successfully “re-created the 
Soviet siege mentality, the complex of being surrounded by enemies . . . Putin has also rekindled 
the old Russian imperial idea, with its superiority complex and the idea that we are on some 
special historical path” (Matthews 2016). This social pressure acts as a shock, only in reverse 
because it deters transition and locks the sophisticated state in place. Russians support a strong 
leader because they believe that they are under threat. 
In addition, elites have successfully convinced the public that rejecting the West means 
rejecting liberalism. Solzhenitsyn for example describes a fight for a moral Russia, an Orthodox 
Russia, and laments the pushing out of Orthodoxy by materialism and western values (1995, p. 
108). This is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Ever since Peter’s efforts at reform, many 
Russians have worried that being civilized and modern meant being “Western” and not 
“Russian” (Kingston-Mann 1999, p. 187). Gerschenkron (1955) notes how this idea is especially 
pervasive among the intellectual class, the same class who typically drives positive institutional 
reform and development. For example, he quotes the Russian intellectual Herzen, “Do not forget 
that in addition Russia remained ignorant of the three scourges which retarded the development 
of the West: Catholicism, Roman law, and the rule of the bourgeoisie. Your labors and your 
sufferings are our lessons” (p. 24). While over the course of history Slavophiles with this view 
have not necessarily held direct power, this set of beliefs underlies more important institutional 
realities. Not only are educated classes who organize and drive reform nonexistent, weak, killed, 
or repressed at various stages as we have traced, but they also repress themselves because of 
strongly held beliefs about how the world works. 
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Widespread corruption, stagnation, and unsatisfactory growth rates signal both the decay 
and conditions created by the sophisticated state. An accurate prediction that Russia would fall 
back into a familiar institutional system rather than transition to open-access could have been 
made on one critical fact alone: the lack of impersonal organizations. Fish (2005, p. 4) noted 
early on that it was clear that the new Russia was not teaming with civil society, but rather any 
movements that did originally exist were fragile and ephemeral. This combined disastrously with 
the well-known disorder and lawlessness in the late 90s. “The weakness of the state and of 
society were two sides of the same coin” (Granville and Oppenheimer 2001). Instead of turning 
to each other to solve disorder, people turned to new elites for order. The system that has evolved 
is somewhere in-between a first-level natural state and open-access society.  
Unsurprisingly, the most accurate parallel is to Russia itself centuries ago. While 
technology and the surrounding context has changed, the basic institutional structure of 
authoritarianism, illiberalism (or dominance of the ancients’ interpretation of liberalism), and a 
personal state unbound by rule of law remains strong. There are shadows of open-access 
organizations, but these exist in an ill-defined system of law and personal relations. Precisely as 
elite wish it to be. This helps to explain why levels of institutional trust are extremely low and 
that two of the most trusted institutions are the church and president (Stickley et al. 2009). Russia 
remains a system of collective action by personal relationship and coercion rather than best 
interest. The result is a set of institutions able to borrow some efficiency from the outside world 
while also maintaining exploitive elite.  
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VI. Conclusion  
“The persistence of royal absolutism or more generally of a preindustrial bureaucratic 
rule into modern times has created conditions unfavorable to democracy of the Western 
variety.” 
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 1966 
 
The Kremlin, from its external projections of imperial force in Georgia and Ukraine to its 
decentralization into regional absolutists loyal to Putin, is a reflection of its institutional past. 
While inferior to the efficient, profit-seeking open-access societies of the West, the Muscovite 
model has proved to be significantly more durable and sophisticated than expected. From 1440 
to the present, regimes that may appear to be different on the surface are in fact strikingly similar 
to the original model.  
Centuries ago, Muscovy emerged as an unlikely winner between principalities in the 
wake of Mongol control thanks to the political shrewdness of its rulers. The fledgling state 
thrived under institutions created in the dualism of Orthodoxy and its relationship to the Tartars. 
This paper identified several key aspects of the institutional system and the forces behind its 
emergence. One is Russia’s unique geographical setting in terms of both weather and security, 
which led to early adoption of communal social organization. As is consistent with Haber (2012), 
such social organization is not easily amenable to open and inclusive society. Rather, it is 
susceptible to a centralized formation of extractive institutions. This deep historical legacy was 
reinforced and adapted at several key moments in history, such as during the rise of the 
Bolsheviks, and continues to play a major role today in rejecting the Western conception of 
liberalism.  
Additionally, the unifying influence and powerful secular institutional system the Mongol 
brought by force set Russia down a much different path from fragmented Europe. Rent 
extracting institutions and local autocracy came into its own under this system and helped fuel 
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the powerful Russian Empire long after the Golden Horde had vanished from the steppe. At the 
turn of the industrial age, however, this system struggled to adapt and eventually collapsed. The 
Soviet Elite that arose in its place took hold of similar extractive and authoritarian institutions. 
Their slight modifications to economic institutions allowed for adoption of some capitalist 
efficiency, but did not result in real transition because they were offset by an even more intensely 
personal state in political life. Finally, conflict, divergence of Orthodoxy from the rest of 
Christendom, and concentrated propaganda evolved over a significant amount of time into a 
powerful concept of Russian nationalism and rejection of influences deemed foreign rather than 
Russian.  
This paper hopes to serve in the first place as a model for similar analysis of countries 
that often confound Western academics. In the second place, it raises broader policy 
implications. Policymakers ought to be wary of failing to comprehend the institutional legacies 
of a country they might seek to influence because the everyday social dynamics of that country 
will naturally be tied up in its past. For Russia specifically, whose entire concept of reality is 
based on longevity —on rejecting and outlasting opponents— half-hearted external efforts to 
force change can only be expected to strengthen the Muscovite narrative.  
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